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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the long-term evolution of legislation that contributed to
the shift of China from a command economy to an economic powerhouse in the capitalist
world economy. Few have discussed whether the concept of neoliberalization, defined as
the process of adapting fiscal conservative and expert oriented policies, explains the
longer-term trend of Chinese development. Therefore, this thesis sets out to make a
determination whether China is evolving towards or away from the neoliberal model. To
answer this question, this thesis analyzes two areas of legislation crucial in a free market:
China’s trade and labor laws since the 1970s. More precisely, this research explores,
through the lens of legislation, whether a trend of convergence between Western,
exemplified by the United States, and Chinese political economies exists, and how the
trend itself has changed over time and why. Using interview data based on 15 interviews
from foreign entrepreneurs who work in Shanghai or Suzhou, this thesis uses the
entrepreneurs’ perception of Chinese trade and labor to seek out reoccurring themes.
Based on the information gathered from the literature on the Chinese development of
wage and labor laws and the qualitative data in the interviews, this thesis found surprising
similarities in Chinese and US policies, effects of those policies that were
complementary, and a clear neoliberal direction in the 1980s-1990s in the United States
and China. This thesis concludes, based on the policies implemented during the 2000s
and 2010s, that this neoliberal direction shifts in both countries, and a different kind of
model is taking shape in both China and the US that diverges from neoliberalism.
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Chapter 1: Is China Neoliberal?
Within the large literature on Neoliberalism, it has been established that the
implementation of pro-market reforms inspired by neoclassical economics has occurred
in context specific ways. Under the rubric of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ or
‘variegated neoliberalization’ scholars have discussed various place specific ways in
which governments across the world have implemented free market reforms, leading to
hybrid models between neoliberalism and pre-existing institutional arrangements. More
recently, the very idea of neoliberalism is being challenged, arguing that oftentimes free
market ideology is not necessarily the best way to interpret trends in policy making.
The evolution of China’s laws and institutions, together with its role in global
trade and manufacturing is at the heart of those debates. Some scholars pointed to the
apparent paradox of China’s reforms supporting the global diffusion of neoliberalism
without having accepted neoliberal principles of policy making (Harvey, 2005), others
pointed out the hybrid character of the Chinese government, having accepted both
Neoliberal and Keynesian principles at national vs. provincial scales (Lan, Pickles, and
Zhu, 2015). However, few have discussed whether the concept of neoliberalization
explains the longer-term trend of Chinese development. Having established that China as
a whole has adopted a mixed system, is it evolving towards, or away from the neoliberal
model? Or rather should a different concept be used?
To answer these questions, this thesis analyzes two areas of legislation crucial in a
free market: China’s trade and labor laws since the 1970s. The goal is to determine
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whether the long-term evolution of legislation that contributed to the shift of China from
a command economy, structured around principles partly inspired by the Soviet Union, to
an economic powerhouse in the capitalist world economy, can or cannot be interpreted in
the theoretical framework of neoliberalization. More precisely, this research will explore,
through the lens of legislation, whether a trend of convergence between ‘Western’ and
Chinese political economies exists, and how the trend itself has changed over time and
why.
Because the notion of ‘West’ is in itself vague, and because various Western
countries exhibited various patterns of adoption of the neoliberal model, or even utter
rejection, I will use one specific country as term of comparison: the United States. First
of all, together with the UK, the United States was the first country to start the process of
abandoning Keynesianism in favor or a neoliberal, laissez faire, political economy under
the Reagan presidency. Second the US had been throughout the 1990s and early 2000s
the strongest supporter of neoliberalism, to the point that policy circles dubbed the freemarket policies adopted by a large number of countries in the 1990s as ‘Washington
Consensus’ (Lopes, 2012). Third, exactly like China has adopted a mixed neoliberal and
Keynesian model, scholars have argued that the US has structured its own domestic
policies as a compromise between Keynesianism and neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005), even
during the years in which US foreign policy was actively promoting neoliberal reforms
across the globe. Fourth, the US itself is showing a specific trajectory, with an increasing
adoption of neoliberal reforms under Reagan, Bush Sr., and Clinton, a more mixed
system under Bush Jr. and Obama, and the possibility of a reversal under Trump’s
presidency. Thus, a comparison with the US allows us to understand neoliberalization not
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as a linear process towards the principles of free market, but as highly contested process
subject to reversals. Fifth and perhaps most important, the bulk of investments that jump
started Chinese development in the 1990s came from a handful of US multinationals, via
the mediation of Chinese expatriates (Harvey, 2005). Thus, the theoretical question of the
long term neoliberalization process of China in relation to the US becomes an empirical
question on the extent to which highly interconnected trade and investments drives
institutional convergence.
Thus, this research involves going through key trade and labor laws enacted in
China at the national and provincial levels since the 1970s, along with other indicators I
chose to analyze in each decade, and comparing them with similar trends in the United
States. In so doing, I seek to answer the following research questions:
A. Does a trend of convergence between ‘Western’ and Chinese political
economies exist?
B. If there is a trend, how has it changed over time?
C. Is China evolving towards, or away from the neoliberal model? Or
rather should a different concept be used?
Answers to those questions contribute to the discussion of China’s reform by adding a
long-term perspective to Lan et al. and Zhu’s (2015) argument about the specific hybrid
characteristics of China’s neoliberalization.
My thesis will consist of five primary chapters, the first of which is the
introduction. This introductory chapter will include a discussion on the notion and
evolution of neoliberalism followed by the methodology of my research.
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The second chapter will be the evolution of labor and trade laws in China and the
US. In developing this chapter, I will break the US and the Chinese literature down into
decades, starting in 1979, when Den Xiaoping combined socialist ideology with
pragmatic market economy whose slogan was “Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics." I will analyze in parallel the key indicators of each decade in the United
States and China, listed in the methodology, along with the trade and labor laws enacted
in China at the national and provincial levels since the 1970s and the trade and labor laws
enacted in the United States since the 1970s.
In the third chapter, I will compare China and the United States by using the
previously analyzed reforms and indictors in the second chapter to analyze trends in US
and Chinese policy. Based on the evolution of reforms and trends in policy in both
countries, I will make a determination whether the United States and China are becoming
more or less close to the neoliberal principle over time.
The fourth chapter of my thesis will include my impression of entrepreneurs in
China. I will discuss the perception of Chinese trade and labor by foreign entrepreneurs,
using interview data from a project titled “Opening the black box of the State” collected
in 2013-2015. In this chapter, I will summarize my analysis of the interview data in order
to determine if the subset of international entrepreneurs are experiencing a convergence
or a divergence from the neoliberal model in China.
In my fifth and final chapter, I will use the information gathered from the
literature of the previous chapters and the qualitative data in the interviews to draw a
conclusion about whether China’s laws are becoming more or less close to the neoliberal
principle over time.
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China and Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism is an ideology that has, since the 1980s to present, “permeated an
enormous amount of policy debates, on the global scale” (Vincent, 2010, p. 347). This
ideology identifies "the unregulated free-market capitalist order as the crucial ground for
all efficient resource allocation” (Vincent, 2010, p. 347). The founding figures of
neoliberal thought took "political ideals of human dignity and individual freedom as
fundamental, as the central values of civilization” (Harvey, 2005, p. 5). In theory,
neoliberalism is an ideology or belief system in which “individual liberty and freedom
are the high points of civilization, which are best protected by strong property rights, free
market, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). Although neoliberalism can be difficult to
define in this day and age, at its core, it is a revival of the eighteenth century doctrines of
individual liberty and freedom.
The overshadowing importance accorded by some "to the phenomenon of
neoliberalism does not signify, however, that it is a clearly defined concept” (Thorsen
and Lie, 2006, p. 2). This is due, in part, because ‘actual existing neoliberalism’ “can
differ profoundly from the theoretical constructs propagated by neoliberalism’s
supporters, including the major international financial institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank” (Hirt, Sellar, and Young, 2013, p.
1243). What makes a practice neoliberal is often very unclear, and the term neoliberal
has come to change meaning overtime. From the 1930s to the 1960s, “neoliberalism had
an earlier life when it was used in a positive sense by a group of intellectuals, including
the economists Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek and Wilhelm Ropke” (EagletonPierce, 2016, p. 175), but starting in the 1980, the term ‘neoliberalism’ came to mean
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something else. During this time, it came to “denote a set of policy tendencies that were
first crafted and tested in Western countries, notably the UK and the US (but also
elsewhere), before spreading to other regions” (Eagleton-Pierce, 2016, p. XIV).
According to academic critics, like the geographer David Harvey (2005), neoliberalism
should be understood as “a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital
accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites” (Harvey, 2005, p. 19), or in
other words, he believes neoliberalism should be read “as an agenda led by, and for,
powerful elites, one which emerged in reaction to the perceived failures of Keynesianism
and the strength of postwar social movements” (Eagleton-Pierce, 2016, p. XIV). Other
critics of neoliberalism argue that neoliberalism, while ill defined, is commonly
associated with the expansion of commercial markets and the privileging of corporations;
“the re-engineering of government as an entrepreneurial actor; and the imposition of
fiscal discipline, particularly in welfare spending” (Eagleton-Pierce, 2016, p. XV).
For the twenty-five years after World War II (1945-1970), "Keynesianism
constituted the dominant paradigm for understanding the determination of economic
activity” (Palley, 2004, p. 2). However, in the mid-1970s "the Keynesian impulse went
into reverse, to be replaced by neoliberalism” (Palley, 2004, p. 2). The motivation lying
behind this attack on Keynesianism was primarily “a concern with taxation and inflation,
brought to widespread attention during the stagflation crisis of the 1970s when both
unemployment and inflation rose dramatically” (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 4).
Soaring inflation battered the U.S. economy in the 1970s, ending only after the Fed,
under Chairman Paul Volcker, abandoned Keynesian policies and "applied contractionary
(tight) monetary policy to rein in inflation"(Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 4). The
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Volcker shock, as it has since come to be known, "has to be interpreted as a necessary but
not sufficient condition for neoliberalization” (Harvey, 2005, p. 24). Ronald Reagan’s
victory over Carter in 1980 is another crucial moment in the movement toward
neoliberalism. Because of forty years of Keynesian economics based on a strong active
role of the government in crisis, this period of extreme unemployment and inflation made
way for Reagan to come in and do things differently. Because "Reagan’s advisers were
convinced that Volcker’s monetarist medicine’ for a sick and stagnant economy was right
on target, Volcker was supported in and reappointed to his position as chair of the Federal
Reserve” (Harvey, 2005, p. 25). Coupled with Volker’s reappointment, the Reagan
administration “provided the requisite political backing through further deregulation, tax
cuts, budget cuts, and attacks on trade union and professional power” (Harvey, 2005, p.
25).
Reagan’s campaign against big government began to change the shape of the
country in the 1980s. His administration’s deregulation of “everything from airlines to
telecommunications to finance opened up new zones of untrammeled market freedoms
for powerful corporate interests” (Harvey, 2005, p. 26). This deregulation had many
effects domestically and abroad. Finance capital increasingly looked abroad for higher
rates of return and deindustrialization at home and shifts to take production abroad
became much more common (Harvey, 2005). Harvey argues that this began the great
“shift towards greater social inequality and the restoration of economic power to the
upper classes” (2005, p. 26). As evidence, he states, “The market, depicted ideologically
as the way to foster completion and innovation, became a vehicle for the consolidation of
monopoly power. Corporate taxes were reduced dramatically, and the top personal tax
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rate was reduced from 70 to 28 percent in what was billed as ’the largest tax cut in
history’” (Harvey, 2005, p. 26).
However, deregulation alone was not sufficient to bring about the deep changes
that begun in the 1980s. Coupled with them, the second large scale transformation was
the so called ‘financialization’ – i.e. the shift of investments, profits and employment
from a mostly domestic manufacturing sector to the financial sector – which became
rapidly transnational. One major consequence of deregulation was the opening up of
financial markets, which had a domino effect of increasing the importance of finance in
the overall economy of developed countries. Harvey argues that "deregulation allowed
the financial system to become one of the main centers of redistributive activity through
speculation, predation, fraud, and thievery” (Harvey, 2005, p. 161). The following
became central features of the capitalist financial system: stock promotions, ponzi
schemes, structured asset destruction through inflation, asset-stripping through mergers
and acquisitions, the promotion of levels of debt incumbency that reduced whole
populations, and dispossession of assets (Harvey, 2005).
Scholars point out that neoliberalism goes hand in hand with financialization.
Because of neoliberalism, a major transition took place that shifted labor from
manufacturing to service jobs. This shift did not take place naturally but occurred because
“a wave of innovations occurred in the financial services to produce not only far from
sophisticated global interconnections but also new kinds of financial markets based on
scrutinization, derivatives, and all manner of futures trading” (Harvey, 2005, p. 33).
Because gains in manufacturing capacity no longer meant rising per capita incomes and
the concentration of financial services did, there was an undeniable power shift away
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from manufacturing to the world of finance (Harvey, 2005). For this reason, “the support
of financial institutions and the integrity of the financial system became the central
concern of the collectivity of neoliberal states” (Harvey, 2005, p. 33). This rising class
power gave an enormous amount of power to bankers, CEOs, and leaders in financial
apparatuses since speculative gains “made it possible to amass enormous fortunes within
a very short period of time” (Harvey, 2005, p. 34).
The large scales of transformation of the global economy – neoliberalization and
financialization – that occurred in the 1980s cannot be explained without an
understanding of how, first, US elites bought into the principles formulated by Hayek and
the Chicago economists, and, second, how they were able to convince the public to buy
in, against the apparent interests of a largely middle class, manufacturing based society.
Harvey describes the spread of neoliberalism in the United States by using the term
‘common sense’, and in using this term, he means that consent was “constructed out of
long- standing practices of cultural socialization often rooted deep in regional or national
traditions” (Harvey 2005, p. 39). This is key for political action since the United States is
a democracy; and therefore, neoliberalism had to be accomplished by democratic means.
As Harvey states, “For a shift of this magnitude to occur required the prior construction
of political consent across a sufficiently large spectrum of the population to win
elections” (Harvey, 2005, p. 39). This popular consent of neoliberalism was generated in
a variety of ways, but more specifically “powerful ideological influences circulated
through the corporations, the media, and the numerous institutions that constitute civil
society––such as the universities, schools, churches, and professional associations”
(Harvey, 2005, p. 40). The elites had enough power and money to organize institutions
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such as think tanks that promoted neoliberal ideals of freedom and liberty. The high
frequency of neoliberal ideas through these institutions, “the capture of certain segments
of the media, and the conversion of many intellectuals to neoliberal ways of thinking,
created a climate of opinion in support of neoliberalism as the exclusive guarantor of
freedom” (Harvey, 2005, p. 40). Harvey then describes how this was a domino effect
when “these movements were later consolidated through the capture of political parties
and, ultimately, state power” (2005, p. 39).
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, "American power grew
yet further" (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 4). The "shock therapy and the big bang
which accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet system in the late 1980s and early
1990s are commonly identified as neoliberal” (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 4), and it
has been argued that neoliberalism was imposed on post-Soviet countries by hegemonic
international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (Gowan, 1995). It
is important to note that "Russia's reformers were not blindly following an ideological
agenda set for them in Washington, DC." (Rutland, 2012, p. 332). With
Russia struggling economically, the Russian leaders were looking for new models of
behavior, and the “prevailing ideas of the Washington Consensus undoubtedly
encouraged Russia's leaders to embrace radical reforms” (Rutland, 2012, p. 332). The
collapse of the Soviet Union along with financial institutions such as the IMF and World
Bank created an environment in the 1990s where world markets become more integrated
and more countries adopt neoliberal policies. While Western countries like the US and
the UK were implementing their policies under the notion of neoliberalism in the 1980s,
it is important to point out that they were not the success stories, but instead, Germany
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and Japan were. Germany and Japan used "state intervention to prevent monopolies and
encourage competition among small and medium-sized businesses” and did
not implement across-the-board free market principles, but both countries managed to
develop reasonably well (Hickel, 2012). In spite of the US and the UK aiming to incur
growth in their economies with neoliberalism, "neither Britain nor the US achieved high
levels of economic performance in the 1980s, suggesting that neoliberalism was not the
answer to capitalists’ prayers” (Harvey, 2005, p. 88). While inflation was lowered and
interest rates fell, this happened at the expense of high rates of unemployment, which
diminished the quality of life for many people and resulted in a mix of low growth and
increasing income inequality (Harvey, 2005). Unlike the US and the UK, the 1980s
belonged to Japan and West Germany as competitive powerhouses of the global economy
(Harvey, 2005). Harvey makes the point that “their success in the absence of any
wholesale neoliberal reforms makes it difficult to argue that neoliberalization progressed
on the world stage as a proven palliative of economic stagnation” (Harvey, 2005, p. 88).
Neoliberal reforms were further pushed across the world because, thanks to a
combination of pressure from the US government and the hiring of economists trained in
top US universities, the two largest international financial institutions, the IMF and the
World Bank, adopted guiding principles borrowed from neoliberalism. Since the 1990s,
“the US government, along with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
have exerted pressure on developing and developed countries alike to adopt similar
reforms” (Hirt, Sellar, and Young, 2013, p. 1244). However, such apparent success of the
neoliberal project did not turn non-Western economies into carbon copies of the US, as
predicted in the early 1990s by Francis Fukuyama, who, under the label ‘the end of
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history’ had assumed a converged of the global political economy towards the liberaldemocratic system (Fukuyama, 1992). Instead, hybrids between neoliberal principles and
local institutional arrangements started to develop.
Scholars studying neoliberalism outside Western settings noticed that this
political-economic ideology did not “trickle down to the local context and then, once it
hits the ground running, work following a clearly pre-determined pathway” (Hirt, Sellar,
and Young, 2013, p. 1245). As Cochrane and Ward state, “It is no longer possible to view
the world through lenses that implicitly or explicitly locate the politics of public policy
within national bounded systems” (2012, p. 5). It is already widely recognized that “it is
rarely possible to transfer policies directly, precisely because they emerge from and are
responses to particular ‘local’ sets of social and political conditions which are not
replicated in the places to which they are transplanted” (Cochrane and Ward, 2012, p. 5).
The evidence suggests “that when neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or
sustain elite power, then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be
unrecognizable” (Harvey, 2005, p. 19). Critics of the neoliberal theory, such as Harvey,
highlight a “creative tension between the power of neoliberal ideas and the actual
practices of neoliberalization that have transformed how global capitalism has been
working over the last three decades” (Harvey, 2005, p. 19).
In discussing neoliberalism, many scholars highlight the idea of crises since it
shows the vulnerability of the system and can be a way to criticize the usefulness of
neoliberalism. Ken Birch and Vlad Mykhnenko argue that "the credit crunch and banking
crisis have exposed the fault lines in the neoliberal economic order that has been
dominant for the last three decades” (2010, p. 4). Many scholars argue that that financial
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crises were used as a tool to spread neoliberalism, and Harvey describes this is much
detail, but his main point is that “financial crises were endemic and contagious” (Harvey,
2005, p. 94). The basic argument is that because neoliberalism is all about opening up
free trade and free markets, countries become very interconnected financially.
Neoliberalism has cycles of boom and bust, and in neoliberal theory, these cycles are free
to express themselves, including the more painful moments of crisis. Either a major or
minor player in that situation might drag along everyone else since neoliberalism made
economies much more interconnected than ever before. The literature surrounding
neoliberalism suggests that the International Monetary Fund was a major player in
spreading neoliberalism, and scholars back up this claim in using many examples of
countries going through crises and the IMF bailing them out. While in many countries it
seemed like neoliberalism was dying due to the various crises, "the institutions associated
with its rise were not all equally moribund. For example, the global economic crisis has
unexpectedly improved the fortunes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an
organization long famous for the neoliberal policy conditions attached to its loans”
(Chorev and Babb, 2009, p. 460). To give a specific example, East Asia had developed
very fast in 1980s and 1990s, but by 1997, they hit a financial crisis. It began with bubble
in housing market, and in reaction, East Asia had to devalue their currency to make
payments on loans. A devastating amount of private capital left the country, and since
banks were unable to invest money, they went under. That situation spread very fast in
Thailand, and like a domino effect, hit everyone. At this point, scholars point out that the
IMF came in and agreed to bail them out under the condition that they adopt more
neoliberal policies such as less state spending, which can make the crises even deeper. It
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has been long argued in the literature that the neoliberal age increased trade, made
countries much more interconnected, and as a result, economic crises became much more
contagious.
Other scholars point to the different impacts and implications of the recent
economic crises in order to illustrate the “diversity in the implementation and
embeddedness of neoliberalism in many countries, thereby suggesting that neoliberalism
is not (and never was) a single hegemonic system in the first place” (Birch and
Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 5). Before the financial-economic crisis in 2008, "the political
ascendance and geographical spread of neoliberalism had been greatly aided by the
maintenance of dogmatic and rhetorical purity” (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 5), and
while persistently advocating “maximum scope for the free play of market forces in
economy and society, neoliberal ideologues were able to specify their own
recommendations aimed at achieving a free market evolution” (Birch and Mykhnenko,
2010, p. 5). The crisis of neoliberalism was embodied in the U.S financial crisis of 2008,
which catalyzed cascading chains of financial crises across the globe (Dutta,
2015). While the great depression, the financial crisis in Mexico, the financial crisis in
Japan, and the financial crisis in Thailand all had different characteristics, all these
various crises in different countries play into the financial crisis of 2008 because “it’s like
everything we’ve seen before, all at once: a bursting real estate bubble comparable to
what happened in Japan at the end of the 1980s; a wave of bank runs comparable to those
of the early 1930s; a liquidity trap in the United States, and most recently, a disruption of
international capital flows and a wave of currency crises all too reminiscent of what
happened to Asia in the late 1990s” (Krugman, 2009, p. 152).
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After the crisis of 2008, scholars started to notice that something was beginning
to change in the global economy and policy making that was leading to a world that is
different than the world Reagan and Thatcher initiated in the 1980s. Yates-Bakker (2013)
and Gereffi (2014) notice that the world after 2008 is not as neoliberal. Yates-Bakker
notices this change in Latin America while Gereffi notices that policies at the global level
are changing. Latin America is particularly interesting because it is becoming the place
where the big innovation of the global economy happened first. In the 1970s, Latin
America was the first example of neoliberal policies, and following a similar pattern in
the early 2000s, Latin American governments were already implementing policies that
were consciously trying to do something different from the principle of free trade that
was strongly advocated by the US and the rest of the world. Yates-Bakker shows that
Latin America is ahead of the curve once again, and he does this though the notion of
post neoliberalism which he describes as "a combination of an ideological project and a
set of policies and practices that revolves around the dual aim of: (1) redirecting a market
economy towards social concerns; and (2) reviving citizenship via a new politics of
participation and alliances across sociocultural sectors and groups” (64). In sum, he
argues that post neoliberalism is a nondramatic shift away from neoliberal principle (free
market and privatization) and is more of an evolution and not so much a
revolution. Neoliberalism in Latin America in the 1990s-2000s stimulated growth, but
this variegated neoliberalism (where the IMF, the World Bank, and some political parties
take some parts of the neoliberal project and apply it in their own ways) also had many
negative impacts on different Latin American countries such as crowding out domestic
producers, sacrificing entire economic sectors. This paired with the small domestic
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profits led to social unrest, and as a result of this unrest, many socialist governments were
elected in various elections in the 2000s. With these new governments, Yates-Bakker
noticed that there were changes in political discourse. Politicians talked less about free
trade and started to talk more about justice, and policy changes were adopted that enabled
states to reassert control over markets. Because people in Latin America were unhappy
with the results of neoliberal policies, the rules of the game of the global economy begin
to change. Yates-Bakker says that it is not dramatic or revolutionary, but we start to see
something different, which leads me into Gereffi’s argument on how the global economy
is changing. Because “the increasing importance of GVCs in the current era challenges
the traditional way of measuring countries’ export performance and international
competitiveness” (Gereffi, 2014, p. 11), he argues that some governments are becoming
more proactive in managing the economy, and rather than having all neoliberal trade
principles, they are trying to target their own supply chains in their policies. He also
argues that there is an emergence of new powerful actors in the value chains and that
power is shifting in the value chains. In the past, the retailer was the most powerful in the
chain, but in recent years in various industries, some other companies, that are not the big
retailer, are emerging as the most powerful. Gereffi believes we are moving from the
traditional Washington consensus model to a post Washington consensus model. The
principles of the Washington consensus such as free trade and no government
intervention are being put into question. In the traditional Washington consensus, leader
firms were Western large manufacturers like Wal Mart, Apple, and GM, but in the post
Washington consensus, Gereffi is seeing new leaders emerge among intermediaries like
Foxconn. The result is fewer and larger suppliers and more profit and innovation outside
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the West.
Since the 1970s, China had developed a hybrid system, and because of the 2008
global financial crisis, scholars point out that other hybrid systems like China also began
forming. Because China had not freed up their capital markets and suffered far less in the
financial crisis of those that had (Harvey, 2010), a new model of doing international
business that is not pure laissez faire like they do in the West emerges. The literature
suggests that China’s policy response to the global financial and economic crisis was
early, large, and well designed (Lardy, 2012). Although "Chinese financial institutions
had little exposure to the toxic financial assets that brought down many large Western
investment banks and other financial firms, China’s leadership recognized that the
country’s high dependence on exports meant that it was acutely vulnerable to a global
economic recession” (Lardy, 2012, p. 5). The Chinese government did not subscribe to
the view that simply by increasing intraregional trade, could by and large weather the
global financial storm that originated in the United States and other advanced industrial
economies (Lardy, 2012). After the economies of "Western nations imploded in late
2008 talk spread, not just in China but also across the West, of the advantages of the socalled China model-a vaguely defined combination of authoritarian politics and stateguided capitalism- that was to be the guiding light for this century" (Wong, 2012).
While many scholars have used neoliberalism to explain what happened to the
economy in various places around the world, there is recent scholarship that has
questioned the relevance of the concept of neoliberalism as a whole and does not believe
it to be a reality anymore. In 2014, Sally Weller and Phillip O’Neill set out to determine
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whether Australia’s development path is or has been neo-liberalist, and these scholars
came to the conclusion that “Australia’s developmental trajectory has never been
neoliberal in intent or outcome, even in a distinct or hybrid form” (p. 106). While
Australia is one case, it is important to highlight Australia’s position in the global
framework. Australia is a part of the advanced economy of the global north and
“therefore is integrated into a transatlantic neoliberal project” (Weller and O’Neill, 2014,
p. 106). While their case study specifically pertains to Australia, the scholars more
generally conclude that “despite numerous liberalizations, neoliberal scripts have been
contested and discarded more often than they have been modified and reproduced”
(Weller and O’Neill, 2014, p. 106). Other scholars also share Weller and O’Neill’s
concern about the “extent to which neoliberalism has become a summary word that elides
a complex reality and dissuades close political engagement” (2014, p. 125). Noel Castree
believes scholars begin their research assuming that neoliberalism exists, but in doing so,
they “are examining contingently occurring processes and outcomes that may well have
operated differently if the neoliberal component had not been present” (2006, p. 4).
Castree suspects neoliberalism will remain a necessary illusion or “something we know
doesn’t exist as such, but the idea of whose existence allows our local research finding to
connect to a much bigger and apparently important conversation” (Castree, 2006, p. 4).
Other scholars also believe we should abandon neoliberalism in contextualizing the
economy at the local and global scales. Clive Barnett argues that neoliberalism
conveniently helps tell the story of how the world operates in explaining how “liberalism
privileges the market and individual self-interest” (2011, p. 270), but through his
research, he concludes that theories of neoliberalism “provide little assistance in thinking
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about how best to balance equally compelling imperatives to respect pluralistic difference
and enable effective collective action” (Barnett, 2011, p. 270). Overall, these various
scholars are contending the relevance of the very concept of neoliberalism and are
concerned that this story has been played out too far. As Weller and O’Neill point out, “If
we know the story too well, our openness to the unexpected is compromised” (Weller and
O’Neill, 2014, p. 125), and when we allow the notion of neoliberalism to include every
aspect that contributes to a regime, “then every observed innovation, including those with
non-neo-liberal motivations, can be rolled into an overarching story” (Weller and
O’Neill, 2014, p. 125).
Within the story of Neoliberalism, it is hard to specifically place China. China sits
in an awkward position since the various literatures have different ideas on how China
fits into the context of neoliberalism. Harvey argues that China is not neoliberal but
enables neoliberalism. While he concludes that China is a “market economy that
increasingly incorporates neoliberal elements interdigitated with authoritarian centralized
control” (Harvey, 2005, p. 120), Nonie argues that contemporary China is not " neoliberal
in either a strong or weak sense, nor undergoing a process of neoliberalization” (2008).
Some literature claims that China is neoliberal at the national level but Keynesian at the
provincial level (Lan, Pickles, and Zhu, 2015) while others believe the “extent to which
(and in what ways) China's reforms can be considered neoliberal is conditioned by the
continuing importance and involvement of the state in all spheres of activity” (Wu, 2013,
p. 620).
Globalization is an indispensable component of neoliberalism. The one thing the
literature generally agrees on is that Chinese development was crucial for enabling
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Western neoliberalism. It is important to not that "as capitalist accumulation proceeds,
both labor and the environment tend to become increasingly more expensive” (Li, 2005,
p. 420), and "capitalism has been able to keep expanding through access to areas where
labor and resources remain cheap and abundant, and where spaces for pollution remain
available” (Li, 2005, p. 420) Towards the late 20th Century, "much of China’s labor force
remained in the rural areas and was readily available for capitalist accumulation on
favorable terms. The political conditions in China were such that massive resource
depletion and environmental pollution would meet with minimal resistance in the short
and medium-run” (Li, 2005, p. 420). Because of China’s vast amount of labor and
organized government, Western countries started outsourcing cheap labor to China.
China provided the fuel that the Western neoliberal nations of the 1990s and 2000s
needed. China went from the poorest to the largest world economy in part because the
Western neoliberal countries implemented neoliberal policies and went out looking for
cheap labor. Overall, the Western neoliberal market economy and Chinese development
could develop together since they were in a trade relationship with each other.
Because Chinese development was pivotal for enabling Western neoliberalism,
the relationship between China and the neoliberal model should be studied more in depth.
While scholars generally disagree on how neoliberalism applies to China, the scholars
studying China have rarely adopted a long-term view. With the long-term view in mind, I
will look at the parallel development of Chinese policies and Western neoliberalism. In
setting out on a different path from other scholars who have previously researched this
subject, my contribution to the literature will be to analyze how the evolution of Western
neoliberalism matches the evolution of Chinese reforms and systems overtime.

20

Methodology
The history of neoliberalism makes clear that the implementation of neoliberalism
itself is not static. Scholars point out the various ways it has evolved from the 1980s. The
literature is also in consensus that China was an important part of its evolution, but
scholars disagree over whether China is neoliberal or not. The key argument of this
thesis is that the very asking of the question of the extent of Chinese neoliberalization
may be masking the nuances of China’s contribution to the global political economy.
First of all, the neoliberal project itself is not static: the policies and ideology that
scholars include under the ever-broadening term ‘neoliberalism’ are in constant flux.
Scholarship about actually existing neoliberalism has shown that the neoliberal project
varies over space; fewer scholars have detailed how neoliberalism has evolved over time.
However, especially the discussion of post-2008 neoliberalism suggests that the temporal
dimension should be taken more seriously. Second, China itself is experiencing a rapid
social, cultural, and economic transformation. Thus, in order to better consider the long
term view, I want to compare on a decade-by decade basis, the main trends in the
evolution of the neoliberal project in the US and global institutions with some of the
major indicators of Chinese neoliberalization.
This thesis chooses to focus on Chinese trade and labor laws as indicators for the
extent to which China approaches neoliberalism over time or not. Neoliberalism
“emphasizes the primacy of markets over government, and which advocates policies that
have led to the deregulation of labor markets, and the dismantling of the social
protections and redistributive policies of the earlier welfare state” (Moutsatsos, 2008).
Because I am analyzing how the evolution of Western neoliberalism matches the
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evolution of Chinese reforms and systems overtime, it stands to reason that labor and
trade laws are key indicators of neoliberalization: according to the literature, the latter
need to be understood as a process of progressive erosion of legal protections to labor; it
also need to be understood as an opening of markets, that do not involve only the
reduction of customs duties, but also give an ‘upper hand’ to private companies when
negotiating with government overseas. Thus, by looking at these two areas of law in their
evolution over time it will be possible to examine whether China is becoming more or
less neoliberal, and whether it is converging with the West.
More specifically, when adopting neoliberal policies, governing states are
prompted to minimize the public sector, privatize all social services, make labor markets
“flexible, i.e., accommodate the fluctuating needs of various industries but without the
safety net of long-term secure employment (Moutsatsos, 2008). These changes in global
labor trends correspond to the shift toward “flexible business practices employed by
corporations and manufacturers and the decline of unionized workforces in industrialized
countries since the 1970s” (Moutsatsos, 2008). Such practices include off-shoring,
outsourcing, and subcontracting. China’s development has clearly benefited from
Western outsourcing, but it is questionable whether or not it has eroded Chinese workers’
safety nets.
Labor and wage laws are key indicators in my research design since the literature
has made it clear that neoliberalism takes shape through laws. Whether through a “rolling
back of regulation or a rolling out of market-style governance, neoliberalism is always
mediated through law” (Grewal and Purdy, 2015, p. 9). The disputes that these laws
address are embedded in such questions as “the scope and nature of property rights
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(including intellectual property), the constitutional extent of the government’s power to
regulate, the appropriate aims and techniques of administrative agencies, and the nature
of the personal liberty and equality that basic constitutional protections enshrine”
(Grewal and Purdy, 2015, p. 9). Because laws can help to directly pinpoint if legislation
is becoming more or less neoliberal (more or less property rights, trade regulation, etc),
trade and labor laws become objective and comparable indicators when analyzing in
parallel the evolution of the main characteristics of neoliberalism in the West with the
evolution of the main characteristics of neoliberalism China.
While some scholars have chosen to use financial systems as indicators in
discussing and analyzing neoliberalism, I chose not to since “China’s financial system is
particularly hard to analyze because it is highly opaque and evolving rapidly” (Elliott and
Yan, 2013, p. 2). Because “every decade sees major changes in the regulation, structure,
and operation of finance in China, consistent with the rapid changes in the nation’s
overall economic and political development,” (Elliott and Yan, 2013, p. 2), China’s
financial system would be hard to directly compare to the West in a quantifiable and
objective way, especially since the Chinese government “intervenes far more actively in
banking decisions than in the West” (Elliott and Yan, 2013, p. 2). Also, this information
would be extremely difficult to obtain since “only a few decades ago the private financial
sector virtually did not exist and all banking was done through branches of the stateowned People’s Bank of China” (Elliott and Yan, 2013, p. 2).
In analyzing the trade and labor laws in China, I chose to look at both the national
level and the local level when possible. Scholars such as Fan Lim believe that the size of
China allows for governments at the local level to experiment with different policies.
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Because “central planning is reconfigured through the dialectical differentiation of
Chinese state spatiality and the variegated adaptation of neoliberal logics across different
scales” (Fan Lim, 2014, p. 242), the national and provincial governments may follow
different patterns (Tu Lan, 2016), so both will need to be investigated.
In analyzing in parallel the evolution of the main characteristics of neoliberalism
in the West with the evolution of the main characteristics of neoliberalism in China, I
chose to use the United States to represent the West. Since the West is so diverse, it
makes more sense to focus on the United States in order to avoid a general comparison
and to be able to specifically compare the indicators of neoliberalism in China with the
indicators of neoliberalism in one representative country of the West. The United States
is the best country to compare with China in the context of neoliberalization since the
United States was the engine of neoliberalism. While neoliberalism was a set of policy
tendencies that were first crafted and tested by both the UK and the US (Eagleton-Pierce,
2016), neoliberal reforms were further pushed across the world thanks to a combination
of pressure from the US government, the hiring of economists trained in top US
universities, and the two largest international financial institutions, the IMF and the
World Bank. Not only is the United States the earliest country adopting the neoliberal
mode, but they are credited with spreading neoliberalism since “the US government,
along with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have exerted pressure
on developing and developed countries alike to adopt similar reforms” (Hirt, Sellar, and
Young, 2013, p. 1244). The United States is also the best indicator when analyzing
neoliberalism in the West compared to China since the United States is the country whose
foreign investments, caused by neoliberal policies in the first place, enabled Chinese
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development.
While scholars debate the extent to which China is neoliberal, the literature also
makes clear that the United States is not fully neoliberal. This is especially clear in the
recent election of President Donald Trump. Scholars point out that Trump “channels the
hostility generated by that neoliberal indifference to the well-being of working people
and its scarcely concealed cultural contempt for heartland America into a racially
inflected anti-establishmentarianism” (Fraser, 2016). In many ways, Trump’s victory, is
both a break from the status quo and something new in that it expects a person with no
government experience to fix the government. This belief says that only a
nongovernmental person can save government (Schultz, 2017). While “his victory is also
a continuation of the Thatcher-Reagan neoliberal policies that see government as bad and
markets as good,” Trump’s win is “born of both neoliberalism and its rejection, at least in
the form practiced under Barack Obama and espoused by Hillary Clinton” (Schultz,
2017, p. 559)
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Table 1: Indicators of neoliberalism in China and West decade by decade
China

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

2010s

West (United States)

Chinese Labor Laws, Chinese
Trade Laws, Secondary
Literature (on effects of those
laws/extent to which labor is
protected), the extent of
opening up the economy

United States Labor Laws,
Unites States Trade Laws,
Secondary Literature (on
effects of those laws, extent to
which labor is protected), the
extent of opening up the
economy
Chinese Labor Laws, Chinese United States Labor Laws,
Trade Laws, Secondary
United States Trade Laws,
Literature (on effects of those Secondary Literature (on
laws/extent to which labor is
effects of those laws, extent to
protected), the extent of
which labor is protected),
opening up the economy
Deregulation, Tax Cuts,
Budget cuts, Labor Unions
Chinese Labor Laws, Chinese United States Labor Laws,
Trade Laws, Secondary
United States Trade Laws,
Literature (on effects of those Secondary Literature (on
laws/ extent to which labor is effects of those laws, extent to
protected), International
which labor is protected),
Dimension (Chinese
International Trade,
negotiation for joining World Manufacturing Sector vs.
Trade Organization)
Finance Sector, Financial
Systems (IMF, World Bank),
Chinese Labor Laws, Chinese United States Labor Laws,
Trade Laws, Secondary
United States Trade Laws,
Literature (on effects of those Secondary Literature (on
laws extent to which labor is
effects of those laws, extent to
protected), WTO negotiations, which labor is protected),
International Trade, impact of International Trade, impact of
2008 crisis
2008 crisis
Chinese Labor Laws, Chinese United States Labor Laws,
Trade Laws, Secondary
United States Trade Laws,
Literature (on effects of those Secondary Literature (on
laws, extent to which labor is effects of those laws, extent to
protected), International
which labor is protected),
Trade, Safety Net (extent to
International Trade,
which China is protecting
Outsource of labor
Chinese labor)
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Table 1 is the general and broad framework for the indicators I will look to when
analyzing neoliberalism in China and the West decade by decade. In the next chapter, this
graph will be filled in with specific indicators and economic reforms. My comparing of
the indicators of neoliberalism in China to the indicators of neoliberalism in the United
States in parallel begins in the 1970s since in the mid-1970s "the Keynesian impulse went
into reverse, to be replaced by neoliberalism” (Palley, 2004, p. 2), and starting in 1979,
Den Xiaoping combined socialist ideology with pragmatic market economy whose slogan
was “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” In the 1970s decade, I will use the
indicators of labor laws and trade laws in China and in the United States, and I will also
examine the extent to which the economy opens up in both of these places. I will use
secondary literature to not only show to context of labor laws, but I will also determine
the extent to which labor is protected.
I will use the same indicators in the 1980s for both China and the United States
that I used in the 1970s, but I will also look into the various policies of the United States
regarding deregulation, tax cuts, budget cuts, and labor unions since Reagan was elected
in the 1980s and began his campaign against big government.
In the 1990s, I will continue to use the indicators of labor and trade laws in both
China and the United States, but I will add an international dimension to the neoliberal
indicators since this is the decade when China began negotiations with the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the collapse of the Soviet Union along with financial
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank created an environment in the 1990s where
world markets become more integrated and more countries adopt neoliberal policies.
In the 2000s, along with the trade and labor laws in China and the United States, I
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will continue to look at international indicators in China since China joins the WTO in
the early 2000s and negotiates special conditions. I will also use the 2008 crisis as an
indictor for China and the United States since the crisis of neoliberalism was embodied in
the U.S financial crisis of 2008, which catalyzed cascading chains of financial crises
across the globe (Dutta, 2015). While many Western investment banks and
other financial firms were brought down by this crisis, China’s leadership recognized that
the country’s high dependence on exports meant that it was acutely vulnerable to a global
economic recession” (Lardy, 2012, p. 5).
In the 2010s, President Trump and the United States question the principles of
neoliberalism that have followed for the last thirty years, so I will not only look at the
labor and wage laws but also the extent to which labor is outsourced and policies are
starting to change. In the 2010 decade, because China is a champion of free trade but is
also actively trying to protect labor, I will look at the safety net they introduced in order
to protect labor.
In comparing the evolution of Western neoliberalism on Chinese laws paying
attention to specific decades of phases, the sources of data I will use will include
A. The secondary literature about neoliberalism in the West at specific
times
B. The different laws enacted by China in the same period
C. The reports and rating of the business environment in China done by
large Western consultancies in specific years
D. Interview data from the current decade
I will match these four sources of data with the evolution of labor and wage laws in
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China.
Taken together, these data will show how Chinese trade and labor laws have
changed and developed to determine if they are becoming more deregulated with more
free trade or more regulated with less free trade. Such development will be matched with
policy development in key Western economies and international institutions to determine
the extent to which the two converge.
This thesis approaches the research questions through a qualitative process of
textual analysis, analysis of secondary data and interview data. First, I will go through
each trade and labor law enacted in China at the national and in some cases provincial
level since the 1970s. This distinction between national and provincial will be examined
closely in my research since China has the ability and leeway to have a lot of variety in
levels of government due to their size. In such a large country with an extremely high
population, it is very possible to adopt certain policies on one level of the government
and adopt different policies on another level. Second, I will contextualize these laws
within lager trends in the organization of the global political economy, drawing on
secondary literature in geography, economic sociology, and political science. In
particular, I will bring the Chinese literature down into decades, starting in 1979, when
Den Xiaoping combined socialist ideology with pragmatic market economy. This is an
appropriate starting place for my analysis since 1979 is also the same year in which the
neoliberal champion Margaret Thatcher was elected prime minister in the UK. I will go
through each decade with the aim of comparing labor and trade laws in China with
patterns of neoliberal reforms in certain Western countries and with the policies enacted
by the international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank.
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Once I have analyzed China’s development of wage and labor laws on both the
national and provincial level of government through each decade, I will embark on my
last stage of research and analysis. Using interview data based on 15 interviews from
General Managers, Lawyers, Trade Commissioners, Project Managers, and various other
workers who work in Shanghai or Suzhou collected in 2013-2015 from a project titled
“Opening the black box of the State,” which are listed in Table 2 below, I will analyze
the perception of Chinese trade and labor by foreign entrepreneurs and seek out
reoccurring themes.
Based on the information gathered from the literature on the Chinese development
of wage and labor laws and the qualitative data in the interviews, I will draw a conclusion
about whether China is evolving towards or away from the neoliberal model.
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Table 2: Occupation and Location of Foreign Entrepreneurs

Occupation
General Manager for SIT
Manufacturing
General Manager for Giuliano
Automotive Equipment

Location
Suzhou
Suzhou

General Manager for FMMG Technical Suzhou
Textiles
Partner for DLA UK LLP
Shanghai
Trade Commissioner for Italian Trade
Commission
Lawyer for Zunarelli B&T
International Law Firm
Head of Corporate & Institutional
Banking for Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A

Shanghai

Head of Italian Desk for Intesa
Sanpaolo S.p.A
Vice Director for Administrative
Committee of Suzhou National Hi-Tech
Industrial Park

Shanghai

Regional Vice President for Strategic
Markets
General Manager for System
technology co. It.

Shanghai

Members Relational Manager for
European Union Chamber of
Commerce in China

Shanghai

Cultural attaché for Italian Cultural
Institute
China Chief Representative for China
Representative Office in Shanghai

Shanghai

Project Manager for Sino-Italian
Campus, Tongji University

Shanghai

Shanghai
Shanghai

Suzhou

Suzhou

Shanghai
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Chapter 2: Decade by Decade Analysis
As the scholars Wang and Karl point out, “Neoliberalism, in truth, relies upon the
strength of transnational and national polices and economies, and it depends upon a
theory and discourse of economic formalism to establish its own discourse.” In this
chapter, I will discuss United States economic reforms using secondary literature in order
to discover trends in US policy. Going through the same process with China, I will
discuss Chinese economic reforms using secondary literature before analyzing trends in
Chinese policy. This chapter involves breaking the US and the Chinese literature down
into decades, starting in 1970s, when Den Xiaoping combined socialist ideology with
pragmatic market economy whose slogan was “Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics." I will analyze in parallel the key indicators of each decade in the United
States and China, listed in Table 3, along with the trade and labor laws enacted in China
at the national and provincial levels since the 1970s and the trade and labor laws enacted
in the United States since the 1970s.
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Table 3: Economic Reforms in China and the West Decade by Decade

China
1970s

•

•
•
•

•

United States (West)
With Mao’s death in 1977 and
Deng Xiaoping’s partial
restoration to political power in
1977, Deng Xiaoping already
displayed a positive new
approach
o In 1978, increasing CCP
support for Deng
Xiaoping’s reformist
agenda culminates in its
basic acceptance by the
11th Central Committee
of the CCP where it was
argued that the reforms
should begin with
agriculture
o In 1979, Deng Xiaoping
becomes Chairman of
the Military
Commission, and he
criticizes dogmatic
approaches to policy and
favors a pragmatic
approach
The restructuring of the farming
system
The raising of procurement
prices
The opening of rural markets
(Guangdong and Fujian
designated as areas open to
foreign investment)
The supplying of industrial
inputs for agricultural
production

•

•
•
•

•

As the United States experienced
stagflation, political leaders and
policy makers, for the first time
since World War II, were in
search of serious alternative
economic policies to Keynesian
In 1971, Nixon officially ended
the US embargo on China
In 1978, airline deregulation
passed
Three major deregulation bills
passed through Congress:
trucking, the Staggers Rail Act,
and the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act
Carter appointed Paul Volcker in
1979 to replace Miller as
chairman of the Federal Reserve
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1980s

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
•

•

•

The decentralization of
financial power to provincial
governments and state owned
enterprises
The institution of measures
actively to attract foreign
capital
In 1980, the establishment of
four special economic zones
(Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou,
and Xiamen) to facilitate the
movement of offshore
manufacturing facilities from
abroad
In 1984, this number expanded
when fourteen more cities
opened up
The position of Hong Kong as
an entrepôt linking East with
West
By the mid-1980s the number
of companies engaged in the
direct export and import trade
had increased dramatically, and
the central government relaxed
controls over local agencies and
prioritized revenue creation.
The reforming of the enterprise
system in 1984
The state restored the bonus
system and adjusted the wage
rate upward
The leadership’s decision to
gradually adjust and decontrol
the prices of a few products at a
time (By 1988, prices of most
farm products and minor daily
use manufacturers had been
decontrolled, but the prices of
wages, interest rates, and
foreign exchange rates were
still under strict government
control)
In 1988, inflation became
rampant, and administrative
controls were restored and

•

•

•
•

•

•
•
•

•
•

Following Chinese economic
reforms of the 1980s, U.S.
consumer goods companies were
increasingly drawn to China
o American companies entered
China by forming joint
ventures with a Chinese
company or government
agency
In, 1980, Congress passed a trade
agreement conferring contingent
Most Favored Nation (MFN)
status on China
Ronald Reagan took office in
1981
Reagan four priorities for
economic policy: increased
deregulation and market
liberalization, tighter control of
the money supply, tax cuts, and
cuts in public spending
Lifting of the remaining controls
on oil and petrol that had been in
place since Nixon’s
administration and the reducing
of taxes on their profits to address
the energy crisis
The air traffic controllers’ strike
of the summer of 1981
The large-scale tax cuts in 1981
The devaluation of labor power
and the steady relative
degradation in the condition of
the working class, which put
downward pressure upon wage
rates and labor conditions
everywhere
Shift from manufacturing towards
financial power
Wave after wave of
deindustrialization hit industry
after industry and region after
region within the US
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strengthened, and price reform
as well as other reforms were
put on hold

1990s

•

•

•

•

The beginning of the 1990s: a
slowdown of the reform
movement.
Reform remained hesitant until
some signs of revival in early
1992
In 1993, Jiang Zemin was
elected as president of the
republic
o This second phase of
reform rested on
regulatory and
administrative
restructuring of the
banking, taxation and
corporate governance
systems, as well as
further exposure to
world markets through
China’s membership in
the WTO
By the mid-1990s, a new legal
framework for labor, wages and
workers’ contractual rights had
been established to replace the
system of “socialist”
administrative regulation
o In 1993, the Ministry of
Labour and Social
Security issued the
Enterprise Minimum
Wage Regulation
o In 1994, the Labor Law
which was passed laid
down a foundation for

•

•

•
•

•

•
•

Policy changes had occurred in
the realm of affordable housing
and urban policy
Household debt sky-rocketed,
which required that financial
institutions both support and
promote the debts of working
people whose earnings were not
increasing
The two Clinton terms occupied
most of the 1990s
Between 1993 and 2000, the
United States exhibited the best
economic performance of the past
three decades
Further deregulation took place in
the electricity market and
environmental regulation
Exports grew rapidly
Technology, competition and
flexibility in goods and labor
markets, and the public sector
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•

•

•
•
•

•
•

•
•

•

workers’ legal and
contractual rights
o During this period,
social conditions in
workplaces were often
poor, labor law
enforcement was weak,
with most local
governments reportedly
favoring business over
migrant workers
Beginning in 1993, China’s
reforms are geared towards
competitiveness
In the mid 1990s, China
reformed its financial and tax
sectors, and opened capital,
bonds and securities markets for
new capital acquisition
In 1994, China introduced a
major tax reform
The new Budget Law became
effective in 1995
In 1997, the Chinese leadership
selected 100 big state
companies for experimenting
privatization
The Asian Financial Crisis of
1997
In the later 1990s, China
initiated substantial reforms in
the financial and fiscal sectors,
adhering to capital markets
The reform of the banking
system in 1998
The negotiations (between US
and China) for China joining
the WTO in 1999
Outcomes of the 1990s reforms
o Price stability replaced
rising inflation
o The number of SOEs
dwindled while the
number of private firms
increased
o Increased market
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competition sharpened
pressure on employers
and employees alike,
contributing to massive
layoffs and social
inequity
2000s

•
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
•

China's admission to the WTO
in 2001
The accelerating of global
reforms of state companies in
China, including stock
exchange listing, buying,
acquisition and merging, initial
public offers, etc.
In 2000, CCP invited private
entrepreneurs and rich persons
to join the Party, and even to
participate in the central power
Chinese rural zones began to
organize democratic local
elections
In 2002, Hu Jintao was elected
General Secretary of the party
and President of China
References to building a
moderate wellbeing society, and
creating a new situation in the
development of socialism with
Chinese features
Since 2003, China had
surpassed the United States to
become the country with the
highest level of FDI inflow in
the world.
Beginning of 2000s, working
conditions in this industry were
marked by low hourly pay, long
and unstable working hours and
detrimental environmental
impacts
An increasing incidence of
strikes and worker protests
The Chinese State responded to
these pressures through a series
of regulatory interventions

•

•

•
•

•
•
•
•

•

The US transformed from a
manufacturing country to one
focused on finance
The US trade deficit with China
in 2005 and 2006 was the largest
deficit it has ever recorded with a
single economy in history and
o Scholars attributed the
deficit to job losses in the
U.S. manufacturing sector
and obstacles to U.S.
exports to China
2000: Bursting of the
Dot.com/Technology Bubble
George W. Bush serves as
President from January 2001January 2009
2001: September 11 Terrorist
Attacks
2002: Stock Market Crash
War on Terror and Iraq War
2008 Financial Crisis (the
housing meltdown, the severe
economic recession, and a
significant downturn in the U.S.
stock market)
In January 2009, Barack Obama’s
presidency begins
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•

•
•

•

•
•

•

2010s

o Three new labor laws
that were passed in
2007: The Employment
Promotion Law, The
Labour Dispute
Mediation and
Arbitration Law, The
Labour Contract Law
During 2004-2008, the credit
and fixed assets for investments
increased excessively
China embarked upon a new
phase of macro control
The shift of the tax policy in
2005 from an active one to a
cautious one, as well as
adopting a restrictive monetary
policy
China’s transforming of the
world-level financial crisis into
an opportunity
The increase of citizen’s
participative role
The establishing a new social
security system, in order to
ensure workers’ rights, and
protect them against market
dysfunction
Reforming the pension system,
and preparing for importing
foreign management of pension
funds on securities market in
2008

The ten years between 2003 and
2012 were acclaimed as “HuWen’s New Deal,” with
referred to the policies with the
goal of constructing a
“harmonious society”
o A series of socioeconomic reforms to
protect the rights of
farmers and peasant
workers
• Migrant workers have replaced

•

•

Barack Obama served as
President from Jan 2009 – Jan
2017.
o Low wage growth and high
job insecurity
o Obama’s moderate fiscal
expansion to promote
economic recovery and falling
unemployment
o Moderate tax increases on
higher income Americans
designed to fund healthcare
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urban workers as the key
concern of the State’s
employment and welfare
policies
• Dramatic changes both in the
urban economy (rapid growth
driven by export-oriented
manufacturing) and in the rural
economy (improvements in
socio-economic conditions
under the State’s new policy)
• A new phenomenon in the
2010s decade: a shortage of
rural labor willing to move to
urban jobs
• Xi Jinping was elected 7th
President of the People’s
Republic of China in March of
2013
o China sought to increase its
control over state-owned
and private enterprises
o Made in China 2025: a plan
announced in 2015 to
upgrade and modernize
China’s manufacturing in 10
key sectors through
extensive government
assistance

•

reform, reduce the federal
budget deficit, and decrease
income inequality
Donald Trump became President
in Jan 2017
o Trumponomics (trade
protectionism, immigration
reduction, individual and
corporate tax reform, the
dismantling of the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, and
the repeal of the Patient
Protection and Affordable
Care Act)
o Five economic trends during
Trump’s term (the growth of
the American economy, US
stocks have had a record run,
US unemployment is falling,
US wage levels have
flattened, the trade deficit is
rising)
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Chinese Economy in the 1970s
In pre-1978 China, the economic system was a command economy with the
following distinctive features: government-made decisions concerning the volume and
composition of output, its production, and distribution; the allocation of resources
through central planning; state ownership of all means of production; and distribution of
income based on the egalitarian principle (Galenson, 1993). Together with other mutually
supporting political and social institutions, “the command economy has developed into an
integrated system with a logic of its own” (Galenson, 1993, p. 12). The strength of such a
system lies in its effectiveness in mobilizing resources and “achieving accelerated growth
in high priority sectors within a relatively short time” (Galenson, 1993, p. 13).
China’s economic performance record in the three decades prior to 1978 provides
ample evidence of continued economic growth, rapid industrialization, and technological
progress in defense-related areas, but the costs of operating a command economy in terms
of wastes and human losses are also high, especially since China’s notable economic
growth was achieved largely through capital formulation rather than an increase in
productivity (Galenson, 1993). Growth of total factor productivity stagnated during the
1960s and 1970s, and China in the later 1970s remained a low-income economy by
World Bank standards, and its per capita GNP was the lowest among the centrally
planned economies (Galenson, 1993). According to many assessments, the standard of
living hardly improved since the 1950s, and it is important to highlight that the principal
reason for China’s failure to break out of poverty was its low level of productivity and
slow growth (Galenson, 1993).
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In the 1970s, China can be seen as slowly opening itself up to the outside world
and foreign trade since the two coastal provinces, Guangdong and Fujian, were
designated as areas open to foreign investment (Galenson, 1993). But in 1977, there was
no sign that China was about to change its economic policies or its cooperation with the
outside world (Tisdell, 2008). Examination of the documents of the Eleventh National
Congress of The Communist Party of China held in 1997 demonstrates a commitment to
past practices and policies, so it seemed that without a change in political leadership
China would be stuck in its old economic ways (Tisdell, 2008). Credit for the change
goes primarily to “Deng Xiaoping and subsequent Chinese leaders who have followed in
his footsteps and have continued to develop, modify and apply his approach” (Tisdell,
2008, p. 3). Before Mao Zedong’s death, Deng Xiaoping believed that there was a need
for economic and social reforms in China, but his approach was rejected by the then
leadership of the CCP (Tisdell, 2008). With Mao’s death in 1977 and Deng Xiaoping’s
partial restoration to political power in 1977, Deng Xiaoping already displayed a positive
new approach (Tisdell, 2008). The following events happened shorty after Deng
Xiaoping’s partial restoration to power which made reform possible: In 1978, increasing
CCP support for Deng Xiaoping’s reformist agenda culminates in its basic acceptance by
the 11th Central Committee of the CCP where it was argued that the reforms should begin
with agriculture; In 1979, Deng Xiaoping becomes Chairman of the Military
Commission, and he criticizes dogmatic approaches to policy and favors a pragmatic
approach (Tisdell, 2008).
During the first phase of reform, the main objective was the restructuring of the
farming system since the many problems confronting the leadership in the immediate
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post-Mao era concerned agricultural stagnation (Galenson, 1993). As evidence of the
extent of agricultural stagnation, during the period 1952-1978, net agricultural output
grew at only 1.8 percent per year while the population grew two percent per year over the
same period (Galenson, 1993). The primary cause of the problem “was not the slower
growth of labor or capital input but the inefficient use of these inputs due to the peasants’
lack of incentives under the commune system” (Galenson, 1993, p. 12). Another reason
Chinese economic reforms began with agriculture was because agriculture was the
foundation of the national economy at the time (Tisdell, 2008). In line with the views of
Deng Xiaoping, it was agreed that economic incentives “should be incorporated in the
economic system and that economic responsibility should be stressed” (Tisdell, 2008, p.
8). By 1978, in order to reform the commune system, some areas introduced various
forms of contractual arrangement. Under the contract system, “a farm household was
obligated to use collectively owned assets, including land and means of production, and
the autonomy to manage his own operations” (Galenson, 1993, p. 12). In effect, this
change reduced the peasant’s marginal income tax from virtually 100 to 0 percent, which
greatly enhanced the peasant’s incentive to produce, and output soared (Galenson, 1993).
In terms of institutional change, the commune system was simply replaced with
individual household farming, in which the farm households now possessed the rights to
use the land and dispose of the income from the land, but not the right to transfer the
lease (Galenson, 1993). The Party recognized this dramatic increase in output and
“readily supported the movement by dismantling the commune system and by
introducing major complementary measures such as raising procurement prices, opening
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rural markets, and supplying industrial inputs for agricultural production” (Galenson,
1993, p. 14).
United States Economy in the 1970s
For most of the 20th century, the basic policies that comprise today’s United
States’ standard economic ideology would have been rejected as absurd since most
economists had moved on to embrace Keynesian thought or some form of social
democracy (Hickel, 2012). The idea that the "market should be allowed to make major
social and political decisions; the idea that the State should voluntarily reduce its role in
the economy, or that corporations should be given total freedom, that trade unions should
be curbed and citizens given less rather than more social protection – such ideas were
utterly foreign to the spirit of the time” (George, 1992). As the United States experienced
stagflation (the combination of unemployment, high inflation, and low or no growth) in
the 1970s, political leaders and policy makers, for the first time since World War II, were
in search of serious alternative economic policies to Keynesian (Jones, 2012).
In June 1971, Nixon officially ended the U.S. trade embargo on China, “sweeping
aside the legal barriers which had hindered significant economic interaction between the
two nations since 1950” (Wang, 2013, p. 2). With restrictions lifted, “U.S. companies
were allowed to export certain non-strategic goods directly to China and haul Chinese
cargo between non-Chinese ports” (Wang, 2013, p. 2). A signal achievement of the
Carter presidency and one of the first supply-side reforms to be attempted was
deregulation. Carter first sent Congress two deregulation bills on trucking and airlines,
which was extremely unusual coming from a Democratic Party president (Jones, 2012).
In October 1978, airline deregulation passed, and in 1980, “three major deregulation bills
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passed through Congress: trucking; the Staggers Rail Act, which liberalized railroad
freight; and the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, which
gave more command over lending to savings and loans associated with mutual savings
banks,” where the last act also abolished interest rate ceilings for banks (Jones, 2012, p.
168). It is important to note that Carter’s efforts at liberalization of industry and finance
must be considered significant since they began the movement toward deregulation in the
United States that continued until the financial crisis in 2007-2010 among policymakers,
especially in terms of the financial markets (Jones, 2012). Even with these policy
reforms, inflation remained the central economic policy concern during the Carter
presidency since inflation pushed close to ten percent in 1977-1978 (Jones, 2012). With
high interest rates and the money supply growing fast, Carter appointed Paul Volcker in
1979 to replace Miller as chairman of the Federal Reserve, who was preserving a
traditional Keynesian monetary expansion (Jones, 2012). Volcker chose “monetary
aggregates as the best measure to control the money supply and ensure that people would
understand that he was resolute in his focus on inflation” (Jones, 2012, p. 169). Volcker
was not raising interest rates, but instead, the market was. Since he was setting a noninflationary path for money supply, “it enabled the Fed to do politically, during the
transition period, what it couldn’t have done in a more direct way” (Jones, 2012, p. 170).
In the State of the Union address in 1979, “Carter proclaimed that government could no
longer solve people’s problems. The Left’s reforms and realizations in the environment
of the 1970s were as fundamental as those on the radical neoliberal right: the economic
and political crises required new responses from those that had been the staple of
governments since the 1940s” (Jones, 2012, p. 171).
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Chinese Economy in the 1980s
In mid-1981, the CPC stressed the importance of striving for the modernization of
China’s economy by “acting systematically and in a staged fashion while basing its
development policies on the realities of Chinese conditions and the level of available
resources in China” (Tisdell, 2008, p.10). In other words, only modest and realistic goals
would be sought. A major systemic change during this period was the decentralization of
financial power to provincial governments and state owned enterprises (Galenson, 1993).
Beginning in 1980s, provincial governments were allowed to collect funds from specific
sources and contributed part of the revenues to the central government according to a set
quota, or in other words, the local governments now had the power to allocate their own
financial resources (Galenson, 1993). Similarly, the enterprises were allowed to retain a
portion of their profits for their own use, and the rationale behind this policy was “based
on the leadership’s perception that the most serious defect of this command economy was
the over centralization of decision-making power” (Galenson, 1993, p. 17). By delegating
power and providing financial incentives to the local governments and producers, the
leadership hoped to revitalize their initiatives (Galenson, 1993). Another key change
during this period was the gradual relaxation of restrictions on the growth of non-state
business, especially since the early 1980s witnessed a marked increase in the share of
output of these organizations, particularly in the service sector (Galenson, 1993).
While two Chinese provinces were opened up to the world during the 1970s, the
1980s expanded upon this opening of the semi-closed economy. In addition to “various
institutional changes to expand external trade, the government instituted measures
actively to attract foreign capital” (Galenson, 1993, p. 18). In 1980, the government
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established four special economic zones, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen, to
facilitate the movement of offshore manufacturing facilities from abroad, and in 1984,
this number expanded when fourteen more cities opened up (Galenson, 1993).
The 1980s witnessed the restructuring of the Chinese domestic economy,
coinciding with China’s opening to the outside world, and “here the position of Hong
Kong as an entrepôt linking East with West was crucial” (Wang, 2013, p. 4). A key step
involved “harnessing Hong Kong’s trading power in world markets by encouraging Hong
Kong firms to sign export processing contracts with businesses in China’s newly
established Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces” (Wang, 2013,
p. 4). By the mid-1980s the number of companies engaged in the direct export and import
trade had increased dramatically, and “the central government relaxed controls over local
agencies and prioritized revenue creation. Government tax incentives to both domestic
and foreign investors virtually turned China’s entire littoral into a lucrative exportprocessing zone” (Wang, 2013, p. 4).
The reforming of the enterprise system is another key event that took place in this
decade. The issuing by the CCP of the document “On Reform of Economic Structures” in
1984 marked an important milestone in the strengthening of China’s economic reforms
and their extension (Tisdell, 2008). It was agreed that “following the success of China’s
rural economic reforms, similar reforms should be extended to the whole economy with
the focus now being placed on the urban economy” (Tisdell, 2008, p. 10). In short, The
Party shifted its attention from rural to urban areas. The urban reform program “outlined
in the Party’s Decision in 1984 and the 7th Five-Year Plan had three main tasks: to
transform the state-owned enterprises from being the administrative subsidiaries of the
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state into independent businesses firms capable of making their own management
decisions and responsible for their own profits and losses, to develop a competitive
market system, and to institute macroeconomic controls” (Galenson, 1993, p. 19). By
continuing and extending reforms, “it was hoped to establish a dynamic economy,
invigorate enterprises and establish an economic system in which economic activity and
production would be responsive to economic values” (Tisdell, 2008, p. 10).
The focus was on enterprise reform. As the former Party chief Zhao Ziyang
admitted, “inefficiency in the state-owned enterprise was a widespread problem and the
underlying cause was the enterprise manager’s lack of initiative” (Galenson, 1993, p 20).
In order to revitalize the enterprises, the state instituted the following: “the director
responsibility system under which the enterprise director, rather than the Party secretary,
had the management authority and responsibility; the contract management system,
whereby the enterprise director entered into a contract with the state that obligated him to
deliver a fixed amount of profit to the state, thus linking the enterprise’s marginal returns
to management performance; and a bankruptcy law, the penalize managers who
performed poorly” (Galenson, 1993, p. 20).
While in the period from 1952-1978, real wages hardly increased, workers
enjoyed permanent job security, and not surprisingly, the workers had no incentive to
work hard, so during the period from 1978-1984, “the state restored the bonus system and
adjusted the wage rate upward” (Galenson, 1993, p. 21). Since 1984, the state went
further by “removing the limit of bonuses, linking the enterprise’s total wages to profits
turned over to the state budget, and promoting some labor mobility by establishing the
contract labor system, labor markets in some cities, and the authority of the enterprise
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managers to hire and discharge workers” (Galenson, 1993, p. 21). Along with the reforms
in production management, the distribution system also went through important changes
(Galenson, 1993). The state loosened its almost complete control over distribution by
allowing more and more items, including some major producer goods like steel, coal, and
cement to be traded on markets (after the producing enterprise delivered its quota to the
state), and overall, the number of trading centers, wholesale markets, rural markets, and
retailers increased sharply (Galenson, 1993). A great amount of progress had been made,
and by 1998, over eighty percent of the state owned enterprises had adopted the director
responsibility system and the contract system (Galenson, 1993). As a result, “the number
of producer goods directly distributed by the state dropped from 256 in 1980 to 27 in
1985; and a large portion of the newly employed workers was on contract basis”
(Galenson, 1993, p. 22).
Despite this progress, there was still a lack of a competitive price system
(Galenson, 1993). Given a set of distorted prices, “there could be no meaningful
measures of economic efficiency, thus making it impossible to enforce financial
responsibility” (Galenson, 1993, p. 23). For example, the procurement prices for
agricultural prices were too low, as well as the charges for transportation, public utilities,
and housing, and the prices of manufactured products were high relative to those of
energy and raw materials (Galenson, 1993). The Chinese leadership was well aware that
relative prices were seriously distorted, and the questions revolved around how to correct
the distortion and how fast the reforms should be made (Galenson, 1993). Ultimately, the
leadership’s decision was gradually to adjust and decontrol the prices of a few products at
a time (Galenson, 1993). Up to the mid 1980s, price reform consisted mainly of price
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adjustments, and subsequently, the emphasis shifted to decontrolling the prices; the
outcome of the piecemeal approach was a mixed price system (Galenson, 1993). By
1988, prices of most farm products and minor daily use manufacturers had been
decontrolled, but the prices of wages, interest rates, and foreign exchange rates were still
under strict government control (Galenson, 1993).
During the 1980s, price reform complicated the situation. For decades, repressed
inflation had existed, and upward price adjustments and price decontrol simply brought
the repressed inflation to the open, creating expectations of price increases whenever
price reform took place (Galenson, 1993). In 1988, the Party decided to push ahead with
price reform despite mounting inflation (Galenson, 1993). However, in September 1988,
inflation became rampant, and the leadership abandoned the plan for price reform; the
policy focus “now shifted to the improvement of the economic environment and
rectification of the economic order,” essentially meaning curbing inflation and checking
corruption (Galenson, 1993) For those purposes, administrative controls were restored
and strengthened, and price reform as well as other reforms were put on hold (Galenson,
1993).

United States Economy in the 1980s
Following Chinese economic reforms of the 1980s, U.S. consumer goods
companies were increasingly drawn to China, and “American companies entered the
country by forming joint ventures with a Chinese company or government agency”
(Wang, 2013, p. 4). For example, early participants included such giants as H. J. Heinz,
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco, Coca-Cola, American Express, American Motors, AMF, Inc.,
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General Foods, Beatrice, Gillette, Pepsi-Cola, Eastman Kodak, AT&T, Nabisco, and Bell
South (Wang, 2013). On January 24, 1980, Congress passed a trade agreement
“conferring contingent Most Favored Nation (MFN) status on China,” which “exempted
Chinese exports to the United States from the high tariff rates stipulated by the SmootHawley Act of June 1930, a measure that was long used to distinguish friends from foes
among U.S. trading partners” (Wang, 2013, p. 3).
When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, he had four priorities for economic
policy including increased deregulation and market liberalization, tighter control of the
money supply, tax cuts, and cuts in public spending (Jones, 2012). Like President Carter,
“with monetary policy in the hands of Paul Volcker’s Federal Reserve, the administration
centered mainly on supply-side reforms” (Jones, 2012, p. 177). The first reform Reagan
made upon entering office was lifting the remaining controls on oil and petrol that had
been in place since Nixon’s administration and reducing taxes on their profits to address
the energy crisis (Jones 2012). There were also two other major events in Reagan’s first
year that helped define the president’s economic program: the air traffic controllers’
strike of the summer of 1981 and the passage of a series of large-scale cuts through
Congress (Jones, 2012). The large-scale tax cuts came about from a legislative process
that began in 1981: the top rate of taxation was reduced successively from 70 percent to
50 percent and then to 28 percent in 1986 (Jones, 2012). Reagan signed into law what
were then the largest tax cuts in American history, and this bill “contributed to the
spiraling of the federal deficit, which expanded from $700 billion in 1981 to over $3
trillion by the time Regan left office” (Jones, 2012, p. 178). The air traffic controllers’
strike led the administration to successfully bust the union and fire all striking workers.
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This event was extremely significant because busting the union, PATCO, and firing
striking workers “entailed shifting the balance of power and interests within the
bourgeoisie from production activities to institutions of finance capital” (Harvey, 2003, p.
65). Financial power could be used to discipline working-class movements, and when the
opportunity arose to launch “a frontal assault on the power of labor and to diminish the
role of its institutions in the political process,” President Reagan's first move was to
destroy the strong collective power of the air traffic controllers (PATCO), which served
notice on the union movement that it “stood to suffer the same fate should any other
group of workers strike” (Harvey, 2003, p. 65). The subsequent devaluation of labor
power and the steady relative degradation in the condition of the working class put
downward pressure upon wage rates and labor conditions everywhere (Harvey, 2003).
Reductions in the "cost of transport, coupled with political shifts on the part of
governments at all levels to offer a positive business climate and to cover some of the
fixed costs of relocation, promoted the kind of geographical mobility of manufacturing
capital that the increasingly hyper-mobile financial capital could feed upon” (Harvey,
2003, p. 64). While the shift towards financial power brought great direct benefits to the
United States, "the effects upon its own industrial structure were nothing short of
traumatic, if not catastrophic” (Harvey, 2003, p. 64). It is important to note that offshore
production became possible and the search for profit made it probable (Harvey, 2003).
Wave after wave of deindustrialization "hit industry after industry and region after region
within the US, beginning with the low-value-added goods (such as textiles), but step by
step ratcheting up the value-added scale through sectors such as steel and shipbuilding to
high-tech imports” (Harvey, 2003, p. 64-65). The US was “complicit in undermining its
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dominance in manufacturing by unleashing the powers of finance throughout the globe”
(Harvey, 2003, p. 65). Into the slums, “favelas and ghettos of insalubrious cities, tried to
get by on less than $2 a day. Awash with surplus capital, US-based corporations actually
began to offshore production in the mid-1960s, but this movement only gathered steam a
decade later” (Harvey, 2012, p. 15). Thereafter, parts made almost anywhere in the
world, preferably where labor and raw materials were cheaper, could be brought to the
United States and assembled for final sale close to the market (Harvey, 2012). Because
“the global car and the global television set became a standard item by the 1980s,” capital
now had access to the whole world’s low-cost labor supplies, and “to top it all, the
collapse of communism, dramatically in the ex-Soviet Bloc and gradually in China, then
added some 2 billion people to the global wage labor force” (Harvey, 2012, p. 15). While
the benefit was cheaper goods from elsewhere to fuel the endless consumerism to which
the US was committed, “US dependency on foreign trade was on the rise and the need to
build and protect asymmetrical trade relations moved to the fore as a key objective of
political power” (Harvey, 2003, p. 65).

Chinese Economy in the 1990s
The beginning of the 1990s saw a slowdown of the reform movement.
In October 1988, “Li Peng, the new premier, announced that reforms in the next two
years would be slow” (Galenson, 1993, p. 25). Several reform programs initiated by the
former Party secretary had been scrapped, and new measures to tighten government
control over a wide range of economic activities had been introduced (Galenson, 1993).
Despite repeated “lip service to deepen reform, the reform movement slowed to a halt,”
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and the on-going reforms consisted largely of experiments in some cities and the
provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, and Haninan (Galenson, 1993, p. 25). Toward the end
of 1990, inflation was brought under control, but the pace of reform remained hesitant
until some signs of revival in early 1992 (Galenson, 1993).
Despite the slowdown of reforms in the early 1900s, Deng Xiaoping’s influence
on China’s development policies continued both directly an indirectly. In 1992, “China’s
transition to a market-oriented economy moved into high gear, symbolized by Deng
Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” of Shenzhen and other Special Economic Zones in South
China” (Wang, 2013, p. 6). He toured the south of China and gave speeches to assure
China and the rest of the world that China’s market reforms and open-door policies
initiated by him would continue (Tisdell, 2008). After Deng Xiaoping’s death, China
continued on the development path that he had pioneered since Deng’s strong
endorsement provided the momentum for a new phase of economic reform (Wang, 2013).
In 1993, after the XIV National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which
“entered history as the first congress to establish the target of building a socialist market
economy in China”, Jiang Zemin was elected as president of the republic (Micu, 2016, p.
124). This second phase of reform, led by Jiang Zemin, “rested on regulatory and
administrative restructuring of the banking, taxation and corporate governance systems,
as well as further exposure to world markets through China’s membership in the WTO”
(Wang, 2013, p. 6). China’s strong commitment to reform yielded multiple outcomes:
“price stability replaced rising inflation; the number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
dwindled while the number of private firms increased, so that the latter employed twice
as many workers as the SOEs by the end of 2004; and increased market competition
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sharpened pressure on employers and employees alike, contributing to massive layoffs
and social inequity” (Wang, 2013, p. 7)
Beginning in 1993, China’s reforms are geared towards competitiveness, concerns
regarding the quality of economic growth, and reconstructing the rule of law (Micu,
2016). In the mid 1990s, China reformed its financial and tax sectors, and opened capital,
bonds and securities markets for new capital acquisition (Micu, 2016). Also, the state
“tried to transfer funds attracted from the banking sector on capital and securities
markets, and, in the last part of this period, it tried to extend its income base by emitting
M2 monetary supply and initial public offers, thus preparing for currency convertibility,
majoring the foreign shareholders’ capital in some fundamental industries, and adopting
flexible monetary and commercial policies, including floating interest rates and exchange
rates, etc” (Micu, 2016, p. 131). All these measures have been supported by aggressive
reforms of the tax and financial systems, in order to reinforce market competition in the
global space, and to stimulate free circulation, facilitating the accumulation of physical
capital. In 1994, China introduced a major tax reform, which established a clear
distinction between national and local taxes, established a national tax agency, and local
tax agencies, each being responsible for its own tax collection, and transformed valueadded tax (VAT) into the main indirect tax collected by the central administration, and
shared by local administrations in a fixed quota of 75/25 (Micu, 2016). This reform was
key since China had no national tax agency before this form, and all taxes were
previously collected by local administrations, which frequently reduced or eliminated
taxes that should have been paid to the central administration (Micu, 2016). The tax
reform made it difficult for local administrations to reduce national taxes as they did in
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the past, introduced a series of fixed tax target figures between national and local
administrations, and led to the reduction of local budget income quota in official
budgetary and extra budgetary accounts (Micu, 2016).
These aggressive reforms of the tax and financial system previously mentioned
began with the privatization of the state sector beginning in 1994. In 1994, this included
the privatization of small and medium state companies at local levels, and in 1997, the
Chinese leadership selected 100 big state companies for experimenting privatization
(Micu, 2016). Still, “the long-term problems of privatization in China are deep-rooted in
entrepreneurial culture, due to the lack of transparency and transparency stimulation in
state companies” (Micu, 2016, p. 125). So, as privatization in China is continuing to
“destroy the predominance and monopoly of state companies, judicial system reforms are
beginning to play a fundamental role” (Micu, 2016, p. 125). In March 1999, China’s
Constitution has been again modified, which is the fourth change since 1982 (Micu,
2016). Overall, both private property and rule of law have been officially integrated into
the Constitution, “underlining that private companies are a compulsory component of
China’s economy” (Micu, 2016, p. 125).
In 1995, China began taking compensation measures and making additional
structural adjustments at market relationships between demand and offer level (Micu,
2016). It was at this time that China rethought budgetary plans and investments structure
as well as suspending overproduction projects (Micu, 2016). The new Budget Law
became effective in 1995, which prohibited the central administration from making
overdraft at the central bank and financing by deficit the current account. “The central
administration could finance by deficit its capital account, but financing had to be
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obtained from governmental bonds. For local administrations, the requirements were
even more severe. No matter of their level, local administrations had to have a balanced
budget, and, besides that, the law strictly controlled bond emission, and restricted the
loans given to local administration on the financial market” (Micu, 2016, p. 124). During
1991-1997, “China followed restrictive monetary and tax policies, interest rates have
been reduced, the money flow on the market was extended in order to revitalize
economy, but inflation rate registered a record, reaching 21,7% in 1994. The government
succeeded to bridle price boost, by maintaining the increase of money offer and the tax
expenses at a moderate level” (Micu, 2016, p. 124). In the later 1990s, China initiated
substantial reforms in the financial and fiscal sectors, adhering to capital markets (Micu,
2016). The reform of the banking system in 1998 transformed bank property “through
swap programs of transforming debts into capital, by means of acquisitions and merges,
allowing foreign companies to penetrate the banking services, opening the internal
interbank market, and introducing regulating demarcation between banks, insurance
companies and brokers” (Micu, 2016, p. 130). Along with the financial system reform,
there was a fiscal system reform in 1998 in order to counteract deflation by stimulating
market demand and mass consumption. In 1998, China imposed a tax exemption for main
import capital products and investment funds (Micu, 2016). The reforms of the 1990s
also revolved around rationalization of the regulating frame, for transparency, justice, and
cohesion, especially with the creating of the Securities Regulatory Commission (CRSC)
in 1993, extending fraud investigations, and restructuring the financial sector and system
(Micu, 2016). China’s reforms also concerned the building of the rule of law with the
reinforcing of disclosure requirements for companies listed at the stock exchange and
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introducing standards and regulations for telecommunication and technology encryption
(Micu, 2016). A key Chinese reform that began in 1995 and extends through today was
China’s extending of their financing sources and the income base. The state
accomplished this through attracting funds through initial public offers and market
recapitalization (bonds, securities, shares, treasury bills, insurances, etc). Lastly, the end
of the 1990s decade was witness to the rigorous restructuration of industries in China
with the open competition in fundamental economic sectors and introducing stimulants
for telecommunication and Internet owners for foreign investors.
China’s current labor regulation framework began to develop during the post1978 reform period, and by the mid-1990s, a “new legal framework for labor, wages and
workers’ contractual rights had been established to replace the system of “socialist”
administrative regulation” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 518). In 1993, the Ministry of
Labour and Social Security issued the “Enterprise Minimum Wage Regulation” (Chan
and Nadvi, 2014, p. 518), and in 1994, the Labour Law which was passed “laid down a
foundation for workers’ legal and contractual rights, a mechanism for solving labour
disputes, and a system of collective consultation and contracting between enterprise trade
unions affiliated to the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and
management” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 518). The 1994 Labour Law established fixed
term contracts as normal, but tenuous employment security was “accompanied by a
situation where social conditions in workplaces were often poor, especially for migrants
and where labor law enforcement was weak, with most local governments reportedly
favoring business over migrant workers” (Pyke and Lund-Thomsen, 2016, p. 57). Local
governments competed with one another to lower labour wages and standards “in order to
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attract inward investors, with local governments turning ‘a blind eye to violations of
China's own labor regulations and laws” (Pyke and Lund-Thomsen, 2016, p. 57).
Because of this law, “migrant workers suffered restrictions on their ability to exercise exit
strategies by changing employers if they did not like conditions and were prohibited by
laws in accessing social benefits” (Pyke and Lund-Thomsen, 2016, p. 57). During this
period, most of China’s labor legislation was concerned with individual rights and could
not address the growing problem of conflict over collective interests (Chan and Nadvi,
2014, p. 518). This means that even though a framework of “collective consultation” was
technically put in place in 1994, independent trade unions were not allowed, and
“without an effective trade union to represent workers’ interests the system of collective
consultation and contracting” could not be implemented (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 518)
Also, many of the individual rights protected in labor laws are were not always enforced
since local authorities could be passive on enforcement, and workers were often “paid
below the legal minimum due to patron–client relations between local government
officials and business” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 518). Overall, during this decade,
“there were serious issues regarding the efficacy of trade unions in China in protecting
members’ interests since there were laws limiting the establishment of independent trade
unions or the right to strike,” and “it seems a particular set of labor regulations together
with weak enforcement enabled the pursuit of an economic strategy of ‘growth at all
costs’, the costs being poor environmental and social conditions” (Pyke and LundThomsen, 2016, p. 57).
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 is a key event in the 1990s decade. In sum,
this financial crisis affected many Asian countries, including South Korea, Thailand,
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Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines. After “posting some of the most
impressive growth rates in the world at the time, the so-called tiger economies saw their
stock markets and currencies lost about 70% of their value” (Kuepper, 2017).
During 1998-2003, China adopted an active tax policy and a “prudent” monetary policy,
in order to counteract the effects of the financial crisis in Asia (Micu, 2016). The
measures “targeted the increase of income for persons with reduced fruition, stimulating
mainly the internal demand. As it reduced interest rates, the government began to tax
deposit interests, and to adjust money demand through open market operations of the
central bank” (Micu, 2016, p. 124). The government also reacted to the crisis and
intervened by reducing its own expenses, contracting more debts for financing
investments into infrastructure (Micu, 2016).
On November 15, 1999, the United States and China finally signed a landmark
agreement on China's accession to the WTO (Fewsmith, 1999). But, the negotiations for
China joining the WTO between China and the United States were rather complicated.
Chinese leaders in favor of China's greater integration into the world economy were
“thrown on the defensive in April by the U.S. rejection of China's unprecedentedly
forthcoming offer for joining the World Trade Organization and by the bombing of the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May” (Fewsmith, 1999). The events of April and May
raised the WTO issue from “the already difficult arena of bureaucratic politics to the
often brutal realm of elite politics” (Fewsmith, 1999). President Jiang Zemin came under
attack by nationalistic opposition leaders for being soft on the United States, so Jiang has
spent much of the time since then defending himself and rebuilding support for joining
the WTO (Fewsmith, 1999). The Clinton Administration, realizing its miscalculation in

62

April, “similarly spent the next six months working to repair U.S.-China relations in
order to bring China back to the negotiating table” (Fewsmith, 1999). Without the efforts
from both China and the United States “to repair the damage done in the spring, an
agreement would have been delayed indefinitely” (Fewsmith, 1999). The agreement on
China's entry into the WTO was as a major step in bringing China into the world, helped
stabilize China's relations with the major powers, and reinforced domestic reform that
lead China to play an increasingly constructive role in world affairs (Fewsmith, 1999).

United States Economy in the 1990s
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, important policy changes had occurred in the
realm of affordable housing and urban policy (Jones, 2012). While President Carter had
continued the shift toward an increased role for the private sector in addressing housing
needs, Reagan went much further, and his administration completed the federal
government’s withdrawal from public housing during the 1980s (Jones, 2012). In sum,
“the Reagan administration had success in driving back what remained of the
government commitment to public provision of affordable housing. But the affordability
crises had not been solved by the turn to the private sector. In fact, the opposite had
occurred” (Jones, 2012, p. 203). Whatever attempts were made by Republican and
Conservative administrations to encourage the private sector to provide low-income
accommodation in the for-profit rental sector clearly failed since reliance on market
based-solutions did not resolve the sever issues of homelessness, poverty, and heath in
many communities in the United States (Jones, 2012). Without state intervention “to
ensure the right level of provision according to the need, the crisis worsened as the
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1990s wore on” since “empowerment and rights and responsibilities were to be
combined with markets and public/private/voluntary sector partnerships in mixed-tenure
neighborhoods” (Jones, 2012, p. 203).
The gap between “what labor was earning and what it could spend was covered
by the rise of the credit card industry and increasing indebtedness” (Harvey, 2012, p.
16). Household debt sky-rocketed, which required that financial institutions both support
and promote the debts of working people whose earnings were not increasing (Harvey,
2012). While this started with the steadily employed population, by the late 1990s, it had
to go further because that market was exhausted, and the market had to be extended to
those with lower incomes (Harvey, 2012). Political pressure was put on “financial
institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to loosen the credit strings for everyone,”
so “financial institutions, awash with credit, began to debt-finance people who had no
steady income” (Harvey, 2012, p. 16). Harvey makes a great point in by pointing out, “If
that had not happened, then who would have bought all the new houses and
condominiums the debt-financed property developers were building?” (16). Overall,
“the demand problem was temporarily bridged with respect to housing by debt-financing
the developers as well as the buyers. The financial institutions collectively controlled
both the supply of, and demand for, housing” (Harvey, 2012, p. 16).
The two Clinton terms occupied most of the 1990s, and between 1993 and 2000,
the United States exhibited the best economic performance of the past three decades
(Frankel and Orszag, 2001). During Clinton’s second term, real economic growth
averaged 4 1⁄2 percent per year, and unemployment fell to four percent, but during the
early 1990s, economists would have considered these outcomes unattainable. Strong
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growth and low unemployment were accompanied by structural budget surpluses and
low inflation, and this economic boom was led by private-sector spending and privatesector employment (Frankel and Orszag, 2001). During this period, some observers
found cause for concern in various aspects of economic performance since “personal
bankruptcies climbed, the personal saving rate plummeted (as measured in the national
income statistics), the trade deficit expanded dramatically, and the stock market may
well have become substantially overvalued,” (Frank and Orszag, 2001, p. 3) but overall,
however, U.S. economic performance during the 1990s was outstanding.
Many of the most fundamental factors in explaining U.S. economic performance
during the 1990s stretch back over two decades or more, and such factors include
deregulation, globalization, and innovation (Frankel and Orszag, 2001). Deregulation in
the United States for the past 25 years witnessed important further steps toward
deregulation. As previous discussed in the other decades, the deregulation trend began
during the Carter Administration, in trucking, airlines, natural gas, and banking, and
during the Reagan Administration, deregulation was extended to the telecommunications
sector (Frankel and Orszag, 2001). During this period, further deregulation took place in
the electricity market and environmental regulation, and while some of these
deregulation efforts have faced bumps in the road, particularly banking and electricity,
the overall effect of deregulation has been to make the U.S. economy more efficient in
the long run (Frankel and Orszag, 2001). Globalization is another fundamental factor in
explaining the United States economic boom in the 1990s. Exports grew rapidly, “a
major selling point for free trade policy,” and “even the increases in imports and in the
trade deficit during the 1990s, though politically unpopular, were a useful safety valve
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during the strongest phase of the U.S. expansion” since “they released pressure from
rapidly growing domestic demand, pressure that would otherwise have shown up as
higher inflation and interest rates” (Frankel and Orszag, 2001, p. 10). The third factor
contributing to the economic boom was Innovation, which “can be further divided into
three types: technology, competition and flexibility in goods and labor markets, and the
public sector” (Frankel and Orszag, 2001, p. 10). Technological innovation, especially
information technology, received much attention during the 1990s, and “although the IT
revolution was not the sole reason for strong U.S. economic performance in the 1990s, it
certainly was a positive factor” (Frankel and Orszag, 2001, p. 11). On another note, the
United States has always had relatively competitive goods and labor markets, but “the
last two decades have seen a further movement in this direction, including the initially
unpopular corporate restructuring of the 1980s and the initially popular dot-com start-up
firms of the 1990s” (Frankel and Orszag, 2001, p. 11). The final category is “innovation
in the public sector. Public- sector reforms include reinventing government and defense
reconversion, which have allowed previously low-productivity resources to be shifted to
more productive uses, and welfare reform” (Frankel and Orszag, 2001, p. 11).

Chinese Economy in the 2000s
After China's admission to the WTO, “privatization became even more
complicated, because it had to face a global acerbic competition” (Micu, 2016, p. 125). In
fact, some transnational companies “intended to give up financial services and joint
partnerships with China, because of even higher risks and costs associated to capital
investments” (Micu, 2016, p. 125). Because of this, China’s pressure towards
privatization reflects the new urgency of observing WTO international standards (Micu,
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2016). China’s reforming elite actively used “its admission to WTO for generating a new
blow regarding additional reforms, reinforcing “The law of companies”, diversifying the
property structure of large-scale state companies, and building modern structures of
corporate governance in China” (Micu, 2016, p. 125).
The 2000s decade marked the accelerating of global reforms of state companies in
China, including stock exchange listing, buying, acquisition and merging, initial public
offers, etc (Micu, 2016). In 2000, Chinese president Jiang Zemin announced his own
doctrine of “Three Represents”, declaring that “CCP invited private entrepreneurs and
rich persons to join the Party, and even to participate in the central power” (Micu, 2016,
p. 125). As its hybrid economy began to come into prominence, China drew farther and
farther away from the previous authoritarian system (Micu, 2016). Strong evidence for
this is the fact that some Chinese rural zones even began to organize democratic local
elections (Micu, 2016).
On November 15th, 2002 at the first Plenary Session of the XVI-th Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing, Hu Jintao was elected General
Secretary of the party and President of China (Micu, 2016). During the congress, there
were “references to building a moderate wellbeing society, and creating a new situation
in the development of socialism with Chinese features” (Micu, 2016, p. 126).
Although this economic system “brought China on the second place of the largest
economies in the world, at internal level, dissatisfaction at population level is continuing,
because the society is strongly biased, which led to the advent of such tendencies as The
New Left; this current is composed of old-school socialists, who consider the present
system a forced march toward market economy and private property” (Micu, 2016, p.
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126).
Based on this context, since president Hu Jintao came into power, he had tried to
define himself as a left-oriented person who was “fighting hard for re-establishing
balance at society level, taking measures in favour of poor people, and supporting the
emergence of a solid middle class” (Micu, 2016, p. 126). In other words, Hu Jintao
drifted away from the policies of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, who allowed businessmen
to join the Communist Party, “thus creating its look as a leader supporting politicians
“with relationships”, while trying to acquire public properties” (Micu, 2016, p. 126).
The 2002 and 2007 congresses debated the directions of long-term economy
development, targeting: the activation of modernization process, the progress and
transformation of economic structures, the improvement of socialist market economy, the
vigorous promotion of computerization, ensuring a healthy and lasting development of
the economy in order to continuously improve the population’s standard of living,
development of rural economy, stimulation of urbanization process, maintaining and
improvement of the basic economic system, and extending the reform of state properties
administration system, deepening the reform of the income repartition system, and
accomplishing the social protection regime, and creating new workplaces for the
population (Micu, 2016). Going along with the economic development plans that were
stated in the 2002 and 2007 congresses, from 2008-2013, the leadership made an effort to
invite renown researchers from abroad to teach in universities, as well as to call back
people born in China (Micu, 2016). The 2000s also saw an increase of the citizen’s
participative role, especially with the establishment of a new social security system, in
order to ensure workers’ rights, and protect them against market dysfunction (Micu,
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2016). A few other actual events that took place in this decade and that were discussed in
the congresses include: the reforming of the pension system, and preparing for importing
foreign management of pension funds on securities market in 2008, continuing anticorruption campaigns from 2008 to 2013, and increasing tax stimuli for boosting
economic growth and observing social security obligations from 2001 to 2009 (Micu,
2016). During 2004-2008, the credit and fixed assets for investments increased
excessively, and in order to stop the economy from overheating and inflation, China
embarked upon a new phase of macro control (Micu, 2016). As a result, the authorities
changed the tax policy in 2005 from an active one to a cautious one, as well as adopting a
restrictive monetary policy (Micu, 2016).
After China joined the World Trade Organization in November 2001, the growth
rate of the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), which had been in decline since
1994, returned to double digits (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 519). Since 2003, “China had
surpassed the United States to become the country with the highest level of FDI inflow in
the world. Export-oriented manufacturers of light goods, such as toys and electronics,
benefited from a tariff reduction after China joined the WTO, which led to rapid
economic growth and an increase in job opportunities” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 519).
By 2004, China had become the world’s biggest garment exporter, “with 26.6 per
cent of global exports. The textile and garment industry accounted for 18.9 per cent of the
country’s total manufacturing employment” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 515). However,
working conditions in this industry were “marked by low hourly pay, long and unstable
working hours and detrimental environmental impacts” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 515) It
is important to note that such features were “linked to the competitive pressures within
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the international garment industry – including persistent demands from global buyers for
higher quality, shorter delivery times, and lower prices – and to industrial upgrading
strategies” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 515). Because the working conditions and real
wages of Chinese workers, especially migrant workers, were been poor, there was an
increasing incidence of strikes and worker protests (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 524). The
Chinese State sought to engage with and respond to these pressures, “most notably
through a series of regulatory interventions aimed at improving the individual contractual
rights of workers and strengthening the social floor through social insurance and pension
provisioning” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 524). Since 2004, labor shortages and worker
protests have resulted in substantial wage gains and improved working conditions in
export-oriented zones, and at the level of the central government, the Chinese State has
steadily legislated new regulations to protect the rights of workers (Chan and Nadvi,
2014, p. 514) At the local levels of provincial, municipal and even county government,
“researchers have also found that the extent of implementation of these labor laws has
increased in recent years” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 514). Such developments suggest a
“new, and generally more optimistic, perspective on the future of labor rights in China”
(Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 514) Since 2005, minimum wage increases have generally
been higher than inflation, indicating a rise in real wage levels, and “apart from local
government initiatives to increase the minimum wage in locations where strike activity
and labour activism has been most pronounced, the central Government has also sought
to strengthen workplace regulations and legislated better labour rights in response to
workers’ unrest” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 522). Evidence of this comes in the form of
the three new labor laws that were passed in 2007, which were the Employment
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Promotion Law, the Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law and the Labour
Contract Law (Chan and Nadvi, 2014). In sum, “the Employment Promotion Law
provided county governments with guidelines on monitoring employment agencies and
facilitating vocational training,” “The Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law
simplified the legal procedures for mediation and arbitration, thereby reducing their cost
to workers in time and money,” and “The Labour Contract Law sought to stabilize and
regulate employment relations by making written contracts a legal obligation for
employers and clearly specifying the conditions under which employers may legally
terminate a labour contract, the procedures they must follow and their legal
responsibilities should they fail to do so” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 522) The Labour
Contract Law and the Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law aim to regulate
workplace relations and limit labour conflict, and the Employment Promotion Law and
the Social Insurance Law address problems in the broader labour market (Chan and
Nadvi, 2014, p. 522). Such developments could suggest “an end to the era of cheap
labour in China and a relatively more optimistic future for Chinese workers, marked by
increasing real wages, better social protection and pension benefits, and improved labour
rights” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 522).
All of the economic changes made by the Chinese leadership in the 2000s are put
to the test with the 2008 global financial crisis. The global economic slowdown, which
began in 2008, had a significant impact on the Chinese economy. China’s media
“reported in early 2009 that 20 million migrant workers had returned home after losing
their jobs because of the financial crisis and that real GDP growth in the fourth quarter of
2008 had fallen to 6.8% year-on-year” (Morrison, 2014, p. 5). Unlike other countries
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responding to the crisis, “the Chinese government responded by implementing a $586
billion economic stimulus package (approved in November 2008), aimed largely a t
funding infrastructure and loosening monetary policies to increase bank lending”
(Morrison, 2014, p. 5). Such policies enabled China to “effectively weather the effects of
the sharp global fall in demand for Chinese products,” and from 2008 to 2010, China’s
real GDP growth averaged 9.7% (Morrison, 2014, p. 5). China is said to have
transformed the world-level financial crisis into an opportunity, “by acquiring long-term
resources from countries like Brazil, Russia, and African states” (Harvey, 2010, p. 69).
As Harvey points out, since China possessed huge surpluses and an untroubled banking
system easily manipulated by the central government, they had the means to act in a more
“full-blooded Keynesian way.” The crash of export-oriented industries and the threat of
mass unemployment and unrest in early 2009 lead the government to form a stimulus
package where nearly $600 billion were put largely into infrastructural projects –
“highway building on a scale that dwarfs that of the US interstate highway system of the
1960s, new airports, vast water projects, high-speed rail lines and even whole new cities,”
and secondly, the central government forced the banks to loosen credit for local state and
private projects (Harvey, 2010, p. 70). Overall, China has emerged from the global
financial crisis “faster and more successfully than anywhere else with growth rates
quickly reviving towards 8 or even 10 percent” (Harvey, 2010, p. 70). China had
“stimulated a partial revival in international trade and of demand for its own export goods
(trade with Latin America has increased tenfold since 2000 and China’s investments in
US debt have helped sustain effective demand for its low-cost products there) (Harvey,
2010).
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United States Economy in the 2000s
In order to demonstrate how the United States had transformed from a
manufacturing country to one focused on finance, as of the end of 2005, “only 10.7 per
cent of all US employment was in manufacturing—down from 21.6 per cent at its height
in 1979—in raw numbers, manufacturing employment totaled 19.426 million in 1979,
17.263 million in 2000, and 14.232 million in 2005” (Scipes, 2009). The U.S. trade
deficit with China in 2005 and 2006 was “the largest deficit it has ever recorded with a
single economy in history,” and “critics attributed the deficit to a raft of factors, most of
which related to job losses in the U.S. manufacturing sector and obstacles to U.S. exports
to China” (Wang, 2013, p. 10). Also, “American critics emphasized the low cost of
Chinese goods and services, arbitrary suppression of the value of the Chinese currency,
market-access barriers, and lack of protection of intellectual property rights and
government transparency” (Wang, 2013, p. 10).
Not only was the United States a country primarily focused on finance rather than
manufacturing in the 2000s, but this decade was also a tumultuous decade for the United
States. During the first 10 years of the 21st Century, “there was a major terrorist attack, a
housing meltdown, a severe economic recession, and a significant downturn in the U.S.
stock market” (Jacobsen and Mather, 2010, p. 2). The Year 2000 was the year of the
bursting of the dot.com/ technology bubble. Before the bubble burst, entrepreneurs saw
potential in online business, and “investors were getting rich off unprofitable stocks with
high prices and higher price/earnings ratios — firms like software companies and all
things computer and Internet” (Peavler, 2017). But, In April of 2000, an inflation report
caused the speculative bubble to burst and there were huge investment losses (Peavler,

73

2017). The 9/11 terrorists attacks helped shape other financial events of the decade, and
after the awful day in September 2001, the economic climate of the United States was
never to be the same again (Peavler, 2017). The New York Stock Exchange was shut
down from September 10 - 17, and some estimate that there was over $60 billion in
insurance losses alone (Peavler, 2017). Also, “approximately 18,000 small businesses
were either displaced or destroyed in Lower Manhattan after the Twin Towers fell,” and
“there was a buildup in homeland security on all levels” (Peavler, 2017). Although the
stock market rallied after post 9/11, it began to decline again in March of 2002; “The
corporate fraud scandals, such as Enron, along with 9/11, were contributors to this loss of
investor confidence in the stock market” (Peavler, 2017). After the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
“the War on Terror was launched in Afghanistan and the Iraq War was launched in 2003.
The cost of these wars is ongoing. To date, the Congressional Research Service has
approved about $944 billion for the operations overseas. This has been an incredible
financial drain on our economy and it is impossible to know what the final cost will be”
(Peavler, 2017).
In the early part of the 21st century, the U.S. housing market was booming,
housing values were high, and just about anyone who wanted to buy a home could buy a
home since individuals and families who, in the past, could not have qualified for a
mortgage were able to qualify for adjustable-rate mortgages with low or no down
payments and low initial interest rates (Peavler, 2017). Banks “made mortgage loans to
these individuals for houses with inflated values. As the interest rates rose and their
adjustable rate loans got more expensive, they couldn't make their mortgage payments,”
and soon, “large financial institutions were holding portfolios of loans that were
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worthless” (Peavler, 2017). In September of 2008, “a seemingly perfect storm of factors
came together to form the deepest economic downturn in not only the U.S., but across the
globe, since the Great Depression” (Peavler, 2017). The great investment banks that had
stood on Wall Street began to collapse due to the sub-prime mortgage crisis and serious
corporate fraud (Peavler, 2017). Even though the United States spent 60 years after the
depression implementing policies to avoid crises, the US stumbled into a huge one with
the 2008 crisis, and Krugman (2009) argues that this happened due to the lack of
regulation, people finding ways around the law, and the government not really objecting
to people finding a way around the law. Businessmen find ways around the rules through
the legal language. They do this by establishing an organization that has some function of
banks but not all, and therefore, they don’t register the organization as a bank and the
rules do not apply. The crisis of 2008 was everything we have seen before all at once and
occurred on all three levels: government level, central bank level, and federal official
level (Krugman, 2009). In 2008, there was the problem of the real estate double paired
with a bank run like in the great depression. Although the US had safeguards that they
put on banks, the other financial institutions did not have these safeguards since they are
not technically banks. As a result of the bank runs, there was not enough money in
circulation, and therefore, a disruption of economic flows around the world since
everyone is interconnected. During the last months of the Bush Administration, the
federal government stepped in to bail out some of these institutions in order to keep the
U.S. financial system afloat, but by the time the Obama Administration reached the
White House in January of 2009, the economy had contracted and the recession had taken
hold (Peavler, 2017).
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Chinese Economy in the 2010s
Although China’s economic growth in the post-reform era has been predicated on
its export manufacturing performance, since the 2008 global economic crisis, China has
“begun to recognize the economic importance of the domestic market and domestic
consumption” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 530). Also, “robust and sustained growth
within the Chinese market has prompted Western retailers and brands to view China not
only as a manufacturing platform but also as a key end market for industries as diverse as
electronics, clothing, sports goods, foods and automobiles. Many Chinese producers have
also begun to refocus their energies on the domestic market” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p.
530)
The ten years between 2003 and 2012 were acclaimed as “Hu-Wen’s New Deal”
(Hu Wen Xin Zheng) by the media and China scholars (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 520).
This referred to the policies of President Hu Jintao who took power in 2003 with the
avowed goal of constructing a “harmonious society” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 520).
Notably, they introduced a series of socio-economic reforms to protect the rights of
farmers and peasant workers, such as when the CPP and the State Council issued a
“Document No. 1” entitled “Opinions on Policies for Facilitating Increases in Farmers’
Incomes” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 520). The document not only focused on the
stabilization of food production, increases in farmers’ income and infrastructural
development in rural villages, but it also “highlighted the rights and interests of peasant
workers, stating that “peasant workers are an important component of the production
workforce” and therefore deserved state protection and basic civic rights” (Chan and
Nadvi, 2014, p. 520). Since then, “migrant workers have replaced urban workers as the
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key concern of the State’s employment and welfare policies” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p.
520). These dramatic changes both in the urban economy (rapid growth driven by exportoriented manufacturing) and in the rural economy (improvements in socio-economic
conditions under the State’s new policy) have given rise to a new phenomenon in the
2010s decade: “a shortage of rural labour willing to move to urban jobs,” which “stands
in stark contrast to the tidal wave of peasant workers seen during the early 1990s” (Chan
and Nadvi, 2014, p. 520). This labour shortage “spread from Fujian province to the Pearl
River Delta and then to the Yangtse River Delta, and eventually to the whole country”
(Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 520). The recent labour shortages reflect the desire of many
migrant workers to seek employment nearer to home, resulting in higher levels of labour
turnover, which, in turn, has also led to shifts of capital (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 520).
This process has been encouraged by the State at the central and provincial levels: the
“Go West, Go Out” policy has indeed “promoted significant relocation of labourintensive manufacturing facilities away from the coastal areas to inland provinces and
abroad” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 521). These developments have generated a growing
debate within China on “whether the labour market might result both in an increase in
real wages and incomes for urban workers, and in additional investment in more capitaland knowledge intensive production” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 521).
Xi Jinping was elected 7th President of the People’s Republic of China in March
of 2013, and under his leadership, China sought to increase its control over state-owned
and private enterprises (Kroeber, 2016). Nobody denies that, during 1993-2013, the
situation in China stabilized, and the country transformed from a radical one (led by
“proletarian dictatorship”) into a more modest state-nation (with “four modernizations”).
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Also, the survival and success of any Chinese company, no matter whether it is owned by
the state or not, was dependent on its performances on the market. By the 2010s decade,
it is safe to say that China has made efforts towards integration into the global
community (Micu, 2016, p. 125). Throughout this decade, the Chinese government has
“made innovation a top priority in its economic planning through a number of high
profile initiatives, such as “Made in China 2025,” a plan announced in 2015 to upgrade
and modernize China’s manufacturing in 10 key sectors through extensive government
assistance in order to make China a major global player in these sectors” (Morrison,
2014, p. 5). Such measures have increasingly “raised concerns that China intends to use
industrial policies to decrease the country’s reliance on foreign technology and eventually
dominate global markets” (Morrison, 2014, p. 5).

United States Economy in the 2010s
Barack Obama served as President from January 2009 to January 2017. The main
economic policies enacted under Barack Obama’s presidency were moderate tax
increases on higher income Americans designed to fund healthcare reform, reduce the
federal budget deficit, and decrease income inequality ("CEA 2017 Economic Report of
the President-Chapter One-Eight Years of Recovery and Reinvestment"). His first term,
from 2009–2013, included policies to address the global financial crisis of 2008. When
Obama came to office in January 2009, “the United States economy was in a deep
recession, with falling real GDP, high unemployment and rising levels of government
borrowing” (Pettinger, 2017). In response, Obama oversaw a moderate fiscal expansion,
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which helped to promote economic recovery and falling unemployment (Pettinger, 2017).
While unemployment fell to pre-recession levels, the US recovery was unevenly
distributed since median wages barely rose, which “compares to a booming stock market
and rising corporate profit levels” (Pettinger, 2017). During this decade of low wage
growth and high job insecurity, many workers have not felt much of a recovery in their
wages and job security since “new jobs are increasingly in the new flexible ‘gig
economy’ which give firms greater flexibility but offers lower wages and greater
insecurity to workers” (Pettinger, 2017). Also, “the challenges of rapid technological
change and increased automation of manufacturing processes have led to profound
changes in the US labour market, which have led to higher inequality and insecurity”
(Pettinger, 2017).
Donald Trump became President of the United States on January 20, 2018.
Donald Trump's signature economic policy proposals, sometimes referred to as
“Trumponomics,” include trade protectionism, immigration reduction, individual and
corporate tax reform, the dismantling of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, and the repeal of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (“What is 'Trumponomics’?”). Trump's tax reform plan was signed into law in
December 2017, which included substantial tax cuts for higher income taxpayers and
corporations as well as repeal of a key Obamacare element, the individual mandate
(“What is 'Trumponomics’?”). Although his term began only a year ago, there are five
economic trends (that explore his relationship with US growth, the labor market and
trade) that have taken shape during his presidency (Palumbo, 2018). The first trend is the
growth of the American economy, especially since “the latest figures, released by the US
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Department of Commerce in December, show that it grew at an annual rate of 3.2% in the
third quarter of 2017” (Palumbo, 2018). But, it is important to note that after the US
central bank, “the Federal Reserve, raised interest rates for the third time in 2017 in
December,” (Palumbo, 2018) so growth might be affected in the upcoming months. The
second trend is that US stocks have had a record run. The Dow Jones Industrial Average,
which follows the shares of 30 major US companies, “has risen to record highs
throughout the past year in a run that stretches back to August 2016”, just before
President Trump's election (Palumbo, 2018). Other US stock markets, including the
Standard & Poor's 500 index and the Nasdaq index, have also reached historical highs.
His supporters claim that his corporation tax cuts, passed shortly before Christmas,
“helped to boost US shares, along with his US-centric policies, his clampdown on
bureaucracy and his promises of infrastructure investment” (Palumbo, 2018). Thirdly,
United States unemployment does seem to be falling, especially since unemployment is
“down to 4.1% in December - and is close to its lowest-ever recorded level of 3.9% in
2001”, which is “less than half the 10% peak of 2010, reached after the global financial
crisis” (Palumbo, 2018). But, this downward trend began during President Barack
Obama's time in office; when President Obama left office, unemployment was 4.8%
(Palumbo, 2018). Fourthly, despite other positive economic indicators, US wage levels
have flattened since Trump took office. Wage growth “has stayed between 2.5% and
2.9% without showing any meaningful rise in the last 12 months” (Palumbo, 2018).
Many economists do not have an answer as to why wage growth has been flat, but “the
general forecast for 2018 is that wages will rise if unemployment continues to fall”
(Palumbo, 2018). Lastly, the trade deficit is rising. While Trump has made improving US
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trade a priority of his administration, the country's trade deficit (when imports are higher
than exports) has actually risen to a level not seen since 2008 (Palumbo, 2018). Some
economists claim that “part of the explanation for the deficit could be that the continued
growth of the US economy, and an increase in consumer confidence, have led to an
increase in the goods bought by US shoppers from overseas” (Palumbo, 2018).
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Chapter 3: Comparison of China and the United States
Analyzing the key economic reforms and indicators of neoliberalism in China and
the United States decade by decade, from the 1970s to 2010s, led me to find surprising
similarities in Chinese and US policies, effects of those policies that were
complementary, and a clearly neoliberal direction in the 1980s-1990s that altered in the
2000s-2010s for both countries.
There was striking parallelism in the economic situation in United States and
China in the 1970s despite the fact that the countries were completely different: China
had a communist system of government based on the ideas of socialism and the United
States economy was driven by the principles of capitalism. The United States
experienced stagflation or unemployment, high inflation, and low or no growth in the
1970s while China remained a low-income economy and its per capita GNP was the
lowest among the centrally planned economies (Galenson, 1993). Just like China was
seemingly committed to their economic ways in 1977, so was the United States since
Keynesianism dominated all economic thought. Despite both countries’ commitment to
patterns of the past, the leadership in China and the United States began to search for
other economic alternatives around the same time. As the United States experienced
stagflation in the 1970s, political leaders and policy makers, for the first time since World
War II, were in search of serious alternative economic policies to Keynesian (Jones,
2012), and similarly, in China, because of Mao’s death and the dire economic situation,
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Deng Xiaoping believed that there was a need for economic and social reforms in China.
Both China and the United States were moving in a clear neoliberal policy
direction throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Elements of neoliberalism, privatization,
deregulation, cuts in public spending, floating exchange rates, protection of property
rights, liberalization of trade and investment, and limits to state power, can be seen in
China and the US throughout these two decades (Xu, 2011). Following the neoliberal
concept of limiting state power, when Deng first initiated the reform, the transformation
of government functions was one of his priorities, and several waves of administrative
reform in the 1980s and 90s reduced the size and responsibility of the government (Xu,
2011). After the leadership in both countries recognized the need for change in the late
1970s, actual reforms were implemented in the early 1980s. Both China and the US
placed their first reforms on the most important sectors in their respective economies.
During the first phase of reform in China, the main objective was the restructuring of the
farming system since the many problems confronting the leadership in the immediate
post-Mao era concerned agricultural stagnation and since agriculture was the foundation
of the national economy at the time (Tisdell, 2008). In effect, the restructuring of the
farming system greatly enhanced the peasant’s incentive to produce, farm households
possessed the rights to use the land and dispose of the income from the land, and output
soared. The Party recognized this dramatic increase in output and introduced major
complementary measures such as raising procurement prices, opening rural markets, and
supplying industrial inputs for agricultural production (Galenson, 1993). Deregulation in
the United States was occurring at the same time as it was in China, just on different
industries. In the United States, one of the first supply-side reforms to be attempted was
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deregulation. In 1978, airline deregulation passed, and in 1980, three major deregulation
bills passed through Congress which liberalized railroad freight, gave more command
over lending to savings and loans associated with mutual savings banks, and abolished
interest rate ceilings for banks (Jones, 2012).
Both China and the United States made huge strides in the 1980s of opening up
their countries to the rest of the world, but it is important to point out that for the United
States opening up meant “going out” and for China this meant “coming in.” By the
United States “going out,” I am referring to offshoring production, and by “coming in,” I
am referring to China allowing other countries to start joint ventures or offshore
production in China. Following Chinese economic reforms of the 1980s, U.S. consumer
goods companies were increasingly drawn to China, and China allowed American
companies entered the country by forming joint ventures with a Chinese company or
government agency (Wang, 2013). In addition to various institutional changes to expand
external trade, the Chinese government instituted measures actively to attract foreign
capital in the 1980s while also establishing several special economic zones to facilitate
the movement of offshore manufacturing facilities from abroad. In the United States,
reductions in the cost of transport paired with the government’s willingness to cover
some of the fixed costs of relocation led to the geographical mobility of manufacturing
capital (Harvey, 2010). In the 1980s, offshore production and the search for profit took
off, and while US-based corporations actually began to offshore production in the mid1960s, this movement gathered steam in the 1980s since parts made almost anywhere in
the world, preferably where labor and raw materials were cheaper, could be brought to
the United States and assembled for final sale close to the market (Harvey, 2010).
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More economic parallelism can be seen in China and the United States in the
beginning of the 1990s since both countries experienced issues with their economies.
Inflation was increasing in China in the beginning of 1990, and toward the end of the
year, it was brought under control, but the pace of reform remained hesitant until some
signs of revival in early 1992 (Galenson, 1993). In the United States, household debt skyrocketed, and political pressure was put on financial institutions to loosen the credit
strings for everyone, so financial institutions began to debt-finance people who had no
steady income (Harvey, 2010). Beginning in 1993, the economies in China and the
United States pick up again, and both countries seem to become more aggressive with
their reforms. Between 1993 and 2000, the United States exhibited the best economic
performance of the past three decades (Frankel and Orszag, 2001). Strong growth and
low unemployment were accompanied by structural budget surpluses and low inflation,
and this economic boom was led by private-sector spending and private-sector
employment (Frankel and Orszag, 2001). Although the economy was booming, personal
bankruptcies climbed, the personal saving rate plummeted, and the trade deficit expanded
dramatically. Beginning in 1993, China’s reforms were geared towards competitiveness,
concerns regarding the quality of economic growth, and reconstructing the rule of law
(Micu, 2016). In the mid 1990s, China reformed its financial and tax sectors, and opened
capital, bonds and securities markets for new capital acquisition (Micu, 2016). All these
measures by the Chinese leadership were supported by aggressive reforms of the tax and
financial systems in order to reinforce market competition in the global space, and to
stimulate free circulation, facilitating the accumulation of physical capital (Micu, 2016).
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The United States made major reforms to taxes beginning in the 1980s, and the
Chinese Leadership, while initially hesitant about making major changes to tax policy,
initiated large reforms in the 1990s. In the United States, the large-scale tax cuts came
about from a legislative process that began in 1981: the top rate of taxation was reduced
successively from 70 percent to 50 percent and then to 28 percent in 1986 (Jones, 2012).
Reagan signed into law what were then the largest tax cuts in American history, and this
bill “contributed to the spiraling of the federal deficit, which expanded from $700 billion
in 1981 to over $3 trillion by the time Regan left office” (Jones, 2012, p. 178). During
1991-1997, China followed restrictive monetary and tax policies, but in the later 1990s,
China initiated substantial reforms in the financial and fiscal sectors, adhering to capital
markets (Micu, 2016). China and the United States, both competitive economies in the
1990s opening themselves up to global markets, came together on November 15, 1999
and sign a landmark agreement on China's accession to the WTO (Fewsmith, 1999). The
agreement on China's entry into the WTO was as a major step in bringing China into the
world, helped stabilize China's relations with the major powers, and reinforced domestic
reform that lead China to play an increasingly constructive role in world affairs
(Fewsmith, 1999).
Parallelism between China and the United States can also be seen in the 1990s
based on the flourishing inequality and reduced welfare for citizens. While China’s
strong commitment to their overall economic strategy (banking, taxation, corporate
governance system, and further exposure to the world market) yielded increased market
competition, there was sharpened pressure on employers and employees, which
contributed to massive layoffs and social inequity (Wang, 2013). During this decade,
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China can be characterized as having a particular set of labour regulations coupled with
weak enforcement which enabled the pursuit of an economic strategy of “growth at all
costs,” the costs being poor environmental and social conditions (Pyke and LundThomsen, 2016, p. 57). Similarly, in the United States, the heavy focus on market basedsolutions only worsened the issues of homelessness and poverty in the United States
(Jones, 2012) since “empowerment and rights and responsibilities were to be combined
with markets and public/private/voluntary sector partnerships” (Jones, 2012, p. 215).
Following increased deregulation and market liberalization was the subsequent
devaluation of labor power since the steady relative degradation in the condition of the
working class put downward pressure upon wage rates and labor conditions everywhere
(Harvey, 2003).
Based on Chinese policies in the 1980s-1990s, China was moving in a neoliberal
direction due to the focus on capital accumulation, the expansion of commercial markets,
the privileging of corporations, deregulation of labor markets, and dismantling of social
protections, but in the 2000s-2010s, we start to see the policies alter in a different, nonneoliberal direction. It could be said that neoliberalism in the West tends to cut the state’s
provision of public goods and brings about severe inequality and the breakdown of social
welfare, but the Chinese state does maintain a commitment to protect such elements for
their citizens. In the 2000s, Chinese rural zones began to organize democratic local
elections, and there was an increase of the citizen’s participative role, especially with the
establishment of a new social security system, in order to ensure workers’ rights, and
protect them against market dysfunction (Micu, 2016). Although in 2002, Jiang Zamin, in
his report to the 16th Congress of the CPP re-affirms China’s policies for economic
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development, he also expresses concern about growing economic inequality in China and
disparities in access to social services (Tisdell, 2008). While Jiang Zamin had tried to
encourage policy to reform such inequality, Hu Jintao went further, and in his report to
the 17th Congress of the CPP, he indicated that policy must pay more attention to China’s
income distribution system, social services system, energy issues, and the quality of the
environment (Tisdell, 2008). The shift in Chinese labor laws is also evidence of a
departure from the neoliberal model, especially with the labor laws passed in 2007. The
developments in labor laws in China in the 2000s could suggest “an end to the era of
cheap labour in China and a relatively more optimistic future for Chinese workers” (Chan
and Nadvi, 2014, p. 522). With the shift in labor law to increased real wages, better social
protection, and pension benefits, China is going against a key aspect of neoliberalism: the
process of progressive erosion of legal protections to labor.
Although China began departing from the neoliberal model in the early 2000s
decade, after 2008, both the United States and China began departing from the neoliberal
model; however, the specific reforms implanted were signaling also a divergence
between the two countries. When the global financial crisis of 2008 hit, both the United
States and China were impacted, but the two countries handled the economic situation in
completely different ways. While China was proactive in trying to thwart the crisis from
negatively affecting the Chinese economy, the United States can be seen as being more
reactive. During the last months of the Bush Administration, the federal government
finally stepped in to bail out some of these institutions in order to keep the U.S. financial
system afloat, but by the time the Obama Administration reached the White House in
January of 2009, the economy had contracted and the recession had taken hold (Peavler,
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2017). The key finding of a divergence from neoliberalism in Chinese policy becomes
clear in the observance of the Chinese Government having major influence in the amount
and nature of investment in China, “particularly in infrastructure and in the selection of
key sectors for development, as well as in human capital formation and in the direction of
scientific and technological research” (Tisdell, 2008, p. 8). Evidence of this takes shape
in the reforms to thwart the global financial crisis of 2008 when the Chinese government
responded by implementing a $586 billion economic stimulus package aimed largely at
funding infrastructure and loosening monetary policies to increase bank lending
(Morrison, 2014). Based on the policy changes in the 2000s decade, it can be argued that
the Chinese economy has become a mixed economy in which “the CCP plays a central
role by providing a general framework or blueprint for China’s development” (Tisdell,
2008, p. 8).
Both countries’ departure from the neoliberal model is evidenced by policy
changes being adopted to enable states to reassert control over markets and the
redirecting of the market economy towards social concerns, but these policy changes in
China and the US are implemented in different ways. We begin to see this in the United
States when Obama takes office in 2009 and redirects the economy towards social
concerns by implementing moderate tax increases on higher income Americans designed
to fund healthcare reform, reduce the federal budget deficit, and decrease income
inequality. With Donald Trump becoming President of the United States on January 20,
2018, so far, there is a continuing divergence from the traditional neoliberal model and a
different kind of model is forming. One of Donald Trump's signature economic policy
proposals is trade protectionism, a principle directly contrary to that of neoliberalism,
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which emphasizes reducing barriers to trade. Trump’s policies also revolve around
boosting manufacturing employment, which involves pressuring international trading
partners to renegotiate trade deals like NAFTA and domestic businesses to keep jobs in
the United States (Karsten, 2017). In trying to bring manufacturing back to the United
States, President Trump has also threatened tariffs on imports of steel to protect U.S.
producers, is seeking to lower costs for manufacturers (both by reducing the corporate tax
rate and by rolling back existing regulations), and hoping to slash funding for existing
training programs in favor of pressuring businesses to invest more in training for their
own workers (Karsten, 2017). While Trump “wants to upend the neoliberal Washington
Consensus” (Smith, 2018) by threatening to impose tariffs on American corporations that
move their production to other countries, at the same time, he is also “doubling down on
some aspects of neoliberalism” (Smith, 2018). This can be seen in Trump's tax reform
plan that was signed into law in December 2017, which included “substantial tax cuts for
higher income taxpayers and corporations as well as repeal of a key Obamacare element,
the individual mandate” (“What is 'Trumponomics’?”). His plans to “cut taxes on the
rich, rip up government regulations that “hamper” business interests, expand Obama’s
fracking program to provide corporations cheaper energy, and to go after public sector
unions” (Smith, 2018) also seem to follow the neoliberal model.
While China in the early 2000s decade began departing from the neoliberal
model, post 2008, the leadership further focuses on the improvement of socialist market
economy, ensuring a healthy and lasting development of the economy in order to
continuously improve the population’s standard of living, the development of rural
economy, and creating new workplaces for the population (Micu, 2016). China post 2008
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clearly makes efforts towards reasserting control over the market, and as scholar Xu
states, “Dubbed as ‘the state advances, the private sector retreats’, this new trend has seen
tremendous growth in the public sector both in size and profitability. From 2003 to 2009,
the total assets of central government-controlled SOEs increased from $1.1 trillion to
$3.2 trillion” (2011, p. 1076). The $600 billion stimulus package announced in 2008 to
minimize the impact of the global financial crisis is also evidence of the states taking
control of the market since the stimulus focused on housing, infrastructure and
transportation industries, which are sectors traditionally dominated by the state (Xu
2011). When Xi Jinping was elected President of the People’s Republic of China in 2013,
China actively sought to increase its control over state-owned and private enterprises
(Kroeber, 2016). Throughout the 2010s decade, the Chinese government made innovation
a top priority in its economic planning, especially through its plan “Made in China 2025,”
which is a plan announced in 2015 to upgrade and modernize China’s manufacturing in
10 key sectors through extensive government assistance in order to make China a major
global player in these sectors” (Morrison, 2014, p. 5). The key phrase in the 2025 plan is
“extensive government assistance” which further shows the Chinese leadership
reasserting control over markets.
Through my analysis of the economic reforms in China and the United States
decade by decade, from the 1970s to 2010s, I have found surprising similarities in
Chinese and US policies, effects of those policies that were complementary, and a clear
neoliberal direction in the 1980s-1990s in the United States and China. But, after
analyzing Chinese and US reforms in the 2000s-2010s decades, this neoliberal direction
shifts in both countries, and a different kind of model is taking shape in both China and
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the US that diverges from neoliberalism since the policies being implemented throughout
those decades run directly contrary to the core practices of neoliberalism. In the following
chapter, I will discuss how a subset of international entrepreneurs is also experiencing
such a divergence from the neoliberal model in China.
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Chapter 4: Interviews- Impression of Foreign Entrepreneurs
Table 2: Occupation and Location of Foreign Entrepreneurs
Occupation
General Manager for SIT Manufacturing
General Manager for Giuliano Automotive
Equipment
General Manager for FMMG Technical
Textiles
Partner for DLA UK LLP

Location
Suzhou
Suzhou
Suzhou
Shanghai

Trade Commissioner for Italian Trade
Commission
Lawyer for Zunarelli B&T International
Law Firm
Head of Corporate & Institutional Banking
for Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A
Head of Italian Desk for Intesa Sanpaolo
S.p.A
Vice Directior for Aministrative
Committee of Suzhou National Hi-Tech
Industrial Park
Regional Vice President for Strategic
Markets
General Manager for System technology
co. Itd.
Members Relational Manager for
European Union Chamber of Commerce in
China
Cultural attache for Italian Cultural
Institute
China Chief Representative for China
Representative Office in Shanghai

Shanghai

Project Manager for Sino-Italian Campus,
Tongji University

Shanghai

Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Suzhou

Shanghai
Suzhou
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
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After analyzing the economic reforms in China and the United States decade by
decade in the previous chapter, I came to the conclusion that in the 2000s-2010s decades
the neoliberal direction shifts in both countries, and a different kind of model is taking
shape in China and the United States that diverges from neoliberalism. In this chapter, I
will summarize my analysis of the interview data based on 15 interviews from General
Managers, Lawyers, Trade Commissioners, Project Managers, and various other workers
who work in Shanghai or Suzhou, which was collected in 2013-2015 from a project titled
“Opening the black box of the State.” Overall, my analysis of the perception of Chinese
trade and labor by foreign entrepreneurs and suppliers of US companies provides further
proof of my conclusion in the last chapter of China’s deviation from neoliberalism in
recent decades since this subset of international entrepreneurs is also experiencing such a
divergence from the neoliberal model in China.
Unlike a typical neoliberal path which tends to cut the state’s provision of public
goods and brings about severe inequality and the breakdown of social welfare, the
Chinese departure from the neoliberal model can be seen in the way that the state
maintains a commitment to protect such elements for their citizens. As addressed in the
last chapter, in the 2000s, there was major effort put forth to ensure workers’ rights and
protect them against market dysfunction, and post 2008, the leadership further focuses on
the improvement of socialist market economy, ensuring a healthy and lasting
development of the economy in order to continuously improve the population’s standard
of living, the development of rural economy, and creating new workplaces for the
population. In an effort to protect their citizens, economy, and well-being of the country
as a whole, China post 2008 clearly makes efforts towards reasserting control over the
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market, dubbed as “‘the state advances, the private sector retreats” (Xu, 2011, p. 1076).
This theme of reasserting control over their markets, focusing on their country
domestically, and serving the Chinese people more and more was continuously repeated
throughout the interviews. The General Manager for SIT Manufacturing in Suzhou
pointed out that while China is a big market entering it is not easy since now business
have to compete with local competitors. In the last five years, the GM has noticed that
labor costs have increased around 10% each year and that manufacturing costs in China
are quite high. Interestingly, the GM asserts that China wants the manufacturing costs to
be high so that companies will relocate elsewhere where labor costs are cheaper; a clear
plan by the central government in Beijing. This so called “Go to West” plan by the
government is an effort to increase the standards of living in less developed parts of the
country. The coast is very developed and the standard of living there is high, so now
China is making an effort to develop the other less-developed parts of the country. The
GM also addressed the notion that Chinese firms are serving the Chinese market more
and more, and the winning strategy for these businesses is producing local to local since
the time for low cost outsourcing is over due to the fact that costs such as labor and
energy are growing. The interviews from the Head of Corporate & Institutional Banking
for Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A and the Head of Italian Desk for Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A also
highlight how China is now focusing in on their internal market. These interviewees point
out that many of their clients in the manufacturing sector over the last five years have
started to change their strategy to manufacture for the Chinese market because the
government “has focused on that, changing the balance of what constitutes the GDP here,
and companies with an original view to manufacture and export to wherever have moved
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toward manufacturing in China and for the China market. So their businesses have
become purely domestic.” The China Chief Representative for China Representative
Office in Shanghai’s interview also contained a similar discussion, as the representative
stated that “China is losing its predominant position as a world exporter, wages are
growing, it is becoming a country of consumers, and thus the cost of producing here is
growing. Because of the growing costs and the long distances of delivery, the batches of
exported goods are becoming smaller. Thus, in order to keep using their enormous
industrial capacity, the Chinese government and enterprises are pushing the development
of the internal market.”
A key aspect of a neoliberal path is implementing policies that open up foreign
markets, but in the most recent decades, China has closed their doors to foreign
employees, implemented laws putting limitations on importers, closed the market in
certain sectors, and established strict regulations on foreign companies.
The interview from the partner for DLA UK LLP touches upon China closing off and
creating barriers for foreign employees, and the partner states, “China is closing doors to
foreign employees. Now they require a higher education degree and two years of work
experience. This creates obstacles to our members, especially in manufacturing.” The
Regional Vice President for Strategic Markets in Shanghai talked about how strictly the
business is being regulated by China, and since the business is in the medical sector, there
is a complex process of registration for their products, and they have to be extremely
careful to insure compliance, as well as monitoring that the quality of our products
remains constant. The VP identified how China is closing off their markets when stating,
“laws are being discussed to put limitations on pure importers like us, so we are
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discussing our next steps.” China is a lot stricter on foreign companies than their
domestic companies, and the interviews make it evident that there is a lot of caution,
hesitancy, and over watch around these foreign companies that do business in China. The
General Manager for System technology co. Itd. discussed how difficult the Chinese
market is, pointing out that in China “laws are applied much more strictly to foreign
companies, and thus our costs are higher…In general, China has a purely commercial
relation with us: they buy our machines until they found a Chinese producer with a
matching product. Part it is because of law enforcement issues: the government strictly
controls that we issue invoices, and they are more lax with the Chinese. Part is ease of
relationships, or even outright nationalism, part is pure cost differential.” This discussion
of the Chinese government making imports difficult, as well as the Chinese market itself
being difficult is continued with the interview from the Members Relational Manager for
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. The manager states, “The market in
China is complicated in some sectors, and completely closed in others. Publishing is
closed to foreigners; automotive manufacturing must be up to 50% joint ventures – or
you can import cars paying very high levies, as Ferrari does. In other sectors the
requirements for foreigners are implicitly higher – for example, food safety regulations
are applied more strictly to foreigners.” In the interview, the manager also address the
Chinese laws concerning banks pointing out that access to credit in China is quite
difficult since the Chinese banks have limits by the Chinese law on how many branches
companies can have and how much they can loan. In another interview, the Cultural
attache for Italian Cultural Institute stated that the “Chinese economy is indeed a mix of
State enterprises and private sector,” and business deals will be successful only when the
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Chinese government is in some way involved. In China, foreigners traditionally cannot
act independently, and foreign investments are always joint ventures with Chinese
counterparts. As a result, the interview states “any business proposal has to be introduced
by a local mediator.” The China Chief Representative for China Representative Office in
Shanghai also hones in on the notion that China is very hesitant in establishing
relationships with the foreign businesses. The representative points out how important it
is to cultivate relationships with their Chinese partners because “once the relationship is
established, the next step is usually to establish a small foothold in China. This often
consists in an office in a business incubator, and hiring a Chinese salesperson that keeps
the connections going and attends all business fairs. After a while there will be space for
a larger investment”
In order to minimize the impact of the global financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese
government implemented a $586 billion economic stimulus package aimed largely at
funding housing, infrastructure, and transportation industries. Such sectors are
traditionally dominated by the state, which shows that the Chinese Government has a
major influence in the amount and nature of investment in China. Because of the reforms
the Chinese leadership implemented in order to thwart the global financial crisis, China
was able to remain economically strong and minimally impacted, and the interviews also
reflect this result. The General Manager for SIT Manufacturing in Suzhou discussed how
the world changed after 2008, and while most manufacturing firms experienced a crisis,
SIT actually financially improved because they kept investing in new plants. The GM
also pointed out how proactive the Chinese government was in trying to prevent the
financial crisis from hurting their economy in saying “working as Suzhou Working
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Group with a far-sighted Suzhou government, we obtained financing at discounted rates
and a one year delay in rent payments for the shed.” The General Manager for FMMG
Technical Textiles in Suzhou also stated that “the crisis did not have a long term effect on
this company in China, just a short term reduction of sales.” The General Manager for
System technology co. Itd. In Suzhou contributed to this discussion of the impact of the
crisis in China stating, “China recovered rapidly, thanks to the huge government
stimulus, and US took much longer.”
After 2008, China evolves very rapidly and the interviewees point out that the
laws and conditions have changed. The Lawyer for Zunarelli B&T International Law
Firm hones in on these changing conditions in saying that “Chinese laws and conditions
have changed, new kind of business is coming, not only manufacturing anymore. Now
we work a lot with engineers, architects, and other kinds of professionals.” The lawyer
also talks about how sector is important since “manufacturing, trading, and services need
different kind of work because Chinese laws are different for each of those. Now very
few new manufacturers are coming, and the other two are more important.” The
interview expands upon his previous statements in stating that “China has recently
changed almost everything in their laws. They made important technical changes in
corporate laws and tax laws.” The lawyer explains that this is because when China
realized that they attracted so many investments they changed their labor laws and made
them much stricter. From the viewpoint of the law, the interviewee asserts that “China
has changed from being a developing country to a developed one, from being an export
base for wealthier countries to an internal market.” From 2000 to 2010 China opened to
the world, but “after 2010, China, conscious of its power, normalized its laws: now
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environmental and labor standards are much stricter, and foreigners cannot come here to
exploit anymore.” The General Manager for FMMG Technical Textiles, in addressing the
Chinese policies that influence the company stated, “The tax bureau and labor
inspectorate impose on you, they are not partners. They produce new laws, they do not
enforce them for years, and them they implement them very fast. China is evolving very
rapidly, and it is difficult to manage.” The Regional Vice President for Strategic Markets
also touches upon the complexity of Chinese laws. Although the company is organized in
three sections, sales, marketing, and regulatory compliance, regulatory compliance is
heavier than elsewhere because of the complex Chinese laws. The VP then discusses the
rapidly evolving country stating “regulations are changing fast, following the pace of
development. The scenario is changing every three to six months, so we need a
permanent presence. The General Manager for SIT Manufacturing in Suzhou compares
China before 2008 to China after 2008. The GM discusses how back in the early 2000s
the Chinese government gave exceptional fiscal incentives, such as giving the land for
free and building sheds for companies. SIT manufacturing paid no taxes for two years,
and 50% for the next three years, but later, when investors reached a critical mass, the
GM says that the Chinese government stopped the incentives. After 2008, the GM asserts
that “the Chinese government (as a part of its decision to develop the domestic market)
began investing billions of yuan in infrastructures: highspeed trains, highways, with the
goal of connecting the cities of 3rd and 4th belt with the coast” and “now they are
repeating the incentives to convince companies to move to 3rd and 4th belt cities and
pushing cities to invest in developing the interior.” Now, as the GM says, the Chinese
government is incentivizing reverse migration to bring the necessary skills to the new
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industrial areas. The government is encouraging people who moved to Suzhou from the
interior to go back through reduced income tax and promises of lower cost and lower
pressure lives.
In Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th Congress of the CPP, he indicated that policy
must pay more attention to energy issues, and the quality of the environment (Tisdell,
2008), and in the interviews there was a reoccurring theme of the Chinese government
making an effort to clean the environment. The General Manager for SIT Manufacturing
in Suzhou discusses how back in 2004, Chinese families (in the South) did not use
heaters, but in a decade, a sizeable middle class developed, and they wanted better living
conditions and heated apartments. Nowadays, they use AC units and electricity that in
China comes mostly from heavily polluting coal plants. In an effort to protect the
environment, China has pledged to cut CO2 emissions 25% by 2020. China also started a
national plan for clean energy. Besides wine turbines and solar, the GM says the bulk of
lean energy will come from gas from Central Asia and Myanmar. The Trade
Commissioner for Italian Trade Commission also discusses the environmental effort in
China in stating that “there are new environmental policies, a strong effort to clean up the
environment, attracting companies in that sector, urban polices (smart cities), and food
policies focusing on healthy and affordable food that are interesting for the food
processing industry.”
In analyzing the interviews, I found that loyalty is an ideal that the Chinese
leadership upholds and values. As Regional Vice President for Strategic Markets states,
“China values companies that have been here for the long run, invested and helped the
country to develop.” China is hesitant towards foreign companies, and based on the
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interviews, it seems that loyalty is a key factor in China establishing a relationship with
foreign companies. The Members Relational Manager for European Union Chamber of
Commerce in China confirms this notion in saying that “trust and respect are extremely
important in China…they take their time, and you need to show you are working for the
Chinese community- your employees and the tax authorities” In another interview, the
Cultural attache for Italian Cultural Institute pointed out that “there are strong taboos that
must be respected in China, or the relationship will break: the validity of the Chinese
political system must not be questioned, as well as their profound veneration for
antiquity.”
Although China began departing from the neoliberal model in the early 2000s
decade, after 2008, both the United States and China began departing from the neoliberal
model; however, the specific reforms implanted were signaling also a divergence
between the two countries. Both countries’ department from the neoliberal model is
evidenced by policy changes being adopted to enable states to reassert control over
markets and the redirecting of the market economy towards social concerns, but these
policy changes in China and the US are implemented in different ways. Another theme I
found when analyzing the interviews was the difference in business relations in China
and the United States. The Lawyer for Zunarelli B&T International Law Firm compared
China to the West and pointed out that “in China information generally is not public, so
you need to connect with people even to find a budget or a balance sheet. But, in Western
countries relationships are easy and recognizable. Here they are not, and moreover they
must be continuously nurtured.” The lawyer further goes on to say that the most
important issue in China is bureaucracy and states that “the power of a single employee
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in a single office is huge. It is difficult to explain this to our clients, that the relationships
with government officials are very important. In China, the government is used to inward
FDIs, but it has policies suspicious of outward FDIs, so sometimes it is difficult for the
smaller Chinese investor to go overseas.” The Members Relational Manager for
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China contributes to this discussion of
comparing China to the West. The manager asserts, “The Chinese government is very
fast in changing laws, and the power of the bureaucracy is very strong: their parliaments
do not meet often, official make the actual regulations. Thus, lobbyists in the West talk to
politicians, here they talk directly to the bureaucracy.
In analyzing the interview data from the 15 interviews, I found the following
reoccurring themes throughout the interviews: China reasserting control over their
markets and focusing on their country domestically, China closing the doors to foreign
business, China thwarting off the negative impacts of the global financial crisis of 2008,
Chinese laws rapidly changing after 2008, China’s focus on environmental and energy
issues, China valuing loyalty in business relationships, and the contrast of business
relations in China and the West. Because of these overarching themes in the interviews, I
came to the conclusion that the entrepreneurs were also experiencing such a divergence
from the neoliberal model in China.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The history of neoliberalism makes clear that China was an important part of its
evolution, but scholars disagree over whether China is neoliberal or not. Because Chinese
development was pivotal for enabling Western neoliberalism, this thesis aimed to study
the relationship between China and the neoliberal model in the long term. In order to
determine if neoliberalism can be used to explain Chinese development, this thesis
analyzed the key economic reforms and indicators of neoliberalism in China and the
United States decade by decade, from the 1970s to 2010s, as well as extracting themes
from interview data based on 15 interviews from foreign entrepreneurs who work in
Shanghai or Suzhou. Three research questions were posed in order to determine the longterm evolution of legislation that contributed to the shift of China from a command
economy to an economic powerhouse in the capitalist world economy.
The first question posed was, “Does a trend of convergence between ‘Western’
and Chinese political economies exist?” In analyzing economic reforms implemented in
China and the United States in parallel from the 1970s to the 2010s decade, I concluded
that a convergence between Western and Chinese political economies existed. My
conclusion comes from the following key similarities between China and the United
States in each decade. There was striking parallelism in the economic situation in United
States and China in the 1970s, despite the fact that the countries were completely
different. In short, both countries were committed to political economic models that had
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not merged after World War II. Both countries were experiencing dire economic
situations after World War II, and despite both countries’ commitment to patterns of the
past, the leadership in China and the United States began to search for other economic
alternatives around the same time. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, both China and
the United States were moving in a clear neoliberal policy direction since the neoliberal
elements of privatization, deregulation, cuts in public spending, floating exchange rates,
protection of property rights, liberalization of trade and investment, and limits to state
power can be seen in China and the United States throughout these two decades. With
both countries strongly committed to their overall economic strategy in the 1990s,
parallelism between China and the United States can also be seen based on the
flourishing inequality and reduced welfare for citizens. After 2008, both countries at the
same time seem to diverge from the neoliberal model, evidenced by policy changes
adopted in the 2000s and 2010s to enable states to reassert control over markets and the
redirecting of the market economy towards social concerns.
My second research question asked, “If there is a trend, how has it changed over
time? As addressed in the previous research question, there was a trend of convergence
between Western and Chinese political economies, and this trend has changed in the way
that the United States and China were going in a clear neoliberal direction in the 1980s1990s, but, after analyzing Chinese and US reforms in the 2000s-2010s decades, I
concluded that this neoliberal direction shifted in both countries, and a different kind of
model is taking shape in both China and the US that diverges from neoliberalism since
the policies being implemented throughout those decades run directly contrary to the core
practices of neoliberalism
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The final question this thesis set out to answer was, “Is China evolving towards,
or away from the neoliberal model? Or rather should a different concept be used?” After
analyzing the key indicators of neoliberalism in each decade in the United States and
China and extracting themes from the interview data from the foreign entrepreneurs in
China, this thesis concludes that China is evolving away from the neoliberal model.
Regarding the question “Should a different concept be used?” I concluded that
neoliberalism is the right concept to use. While the policies being implemented in the
most recent decades are not neoliberal, the concept of neoliberalism can be used to
explain such reforms because the policies implemented run directly contrary to the core
practices of neoliberalism. Based on Chinese policies in the 1980s-1990s, China was
moving in a neoliberal direction due to the focus on capital accumulation, the expansion
of commercial markets, the privileging of corporations, deregulation of labor markets,
and dismantling of social protections, but in the 2000s-2010s, we start to see the policies
alter in a different, non-neoliberal direction. During this time, the Chinese state maintains
a commitment to protect many elements for their citizens, such as the establishment of a
new social security system in order to ensure workers’ rights and protect them against
market dysfunction. In the 2000s, China began to pay more attention to China’s income
distribution system, social services system, energy issues, and the quality of the
environment. The shift in Chinese labor laws in the 2000s signal a departure from
neoliberalism since such developments in labor suggest an end to the era of cheap labour
in China and a relatively more optimistic future for Chinese workers due to the increased
real wages, better social protection, and pension benefits. Such reforms in China directly
contradict a key tenant of neoliberalism, the process of progressive erosion of legal
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protections to labor. China’s departure from the neoliberal model is evidenced by policy
changes being adopted to enable states to reassert control over markets and the
redirecting of the market economy towards social concerns. Post 2008, the Chinese
Government has major influence in the amount and nature of investment in China,
particularly in infrastructure and in the selection of key sectors for development.
Continuing to stray from the neoliberal path in the current decade, the Chinese leadership
further focuses on the improvement of socialist market economy, ensuring a healthy and
lasting development of the economy in order to continuously improve the population’s
standard of living, the development of rural economy, and creating new workplaces for
the population. The interviews from the foreign entrepreneurs in china further back up the
claim that China is diverging from a neoliberal path. The interviews stress how China in
the current decade is reasserting control over their markets, focusing on their country
domestically, and serving the Chinese people more and more. A key aspect of a
neoliberal path is implementing policies that open up foreign markets, but as addressed in
the interview data, in the most recent decades, China has closed their doors to foreign
employees, implemented laws putting limitations on importers, closed the market in
certain sectors, and established strict regulations on foreign companies.
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